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ABSTRACT 
 
JASON MOLDOFF: The Joke’s on You: The Effects of Disparaging Political Humor on 
Young Citizens’ Attitudes and Behaviors  
(Under the direction of Anne Johnston) 
 
 
Two experiments were run to test whether young voters were susceptible to stereotype threat 
effects under a variety of conditions. Results for Experiment 1 indicate that making the age 
of young citizens salient before taking a political knowledge test did not affect their sense of 
political information efficacy or performance. Making the diagnostic nature of the test salient 
did result in a significant decrease in performance, but this difference was eliminated when 
the age salience manipulation was also included. Results for Experiment 2 revealed a 
significant 2-way interaction between the expectation of humor, exposure to disparaging 
humor, and performance on the political knowledge test. Participants performed significantly 
worse on the political knowledge test when they were unexpectedly exposed to humorous as 
compared to non-humorous disparagement. Participants made to expect humor performed 
significantly worse on the political knowledge test when they did not receive humor than 
when they did receive humor. Implications for the study of political humor are discussed and 
opportunities for future research are detailed.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 Every once in a while, a news story appears that includes the results of a survey 
showing some startling findings about the lack of political knowledge among Americans in 
general, and young Americans in particular. For instance, several media outlets picked up on 
a Pew Research report released in 2007 that found only 61% of Americans age 18-29 could 
name the vice-president (Pew, 2007), while in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, a 
widely cited National Geographic-Roper survey reported that only 13% of young people 
could locate Iraq on a map (National Geographic, 2002).   
 News coverage of young voters as poorly informed continued through the 2008 
presidential campaign. In an opinion piece for The Tundra Drums, an Alaskan newspaper, 
Richard Brake reported that a political knowledge survey found, “our future voters and 
leaders are graduating with little knowledge about how our system works and how it has 
performed over time” (Brake, 2008, para. 13). Among the statistics cited, Brake noted that 
less than half the college-age respondents knew the meaning of federalism, while “fewer than 
40 percent knew the basics of monetary and fiscal policy.” (Brake, 2008, para. 14). As part of 
a segment on the television show 20/20, host John Stossel conducted an informal survey and 
came to the conclusion that “many of the young voters didn’t seem very informed,” leading 
him to propose that perhaps uninformed voters should stay away from the polls on Election 
Day (Stossel, 2008). 
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 In addition to news and editorial coverage, the stereotype of young voters as 
politically uninformed figures prominently in the entertainment media. Americans seems 
fascinated with the seeming idiocy of their countrypersons. There are popular television 
programs and late-night segments dedicated to fulfilling our desire to poke fun at the not-so-
bright side of all of us (e.g., Are You Smarter than a Fifth Grader, Jaywalking segment on 
The Tonight Show with Jay Leno and The Jay Leno Show). One of the most popular outlets 
for political information amongst young people, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, has 
repeatedly mocked young people for their lack of knowledge and engagement. 
 For instance, on February 28th, 2008, in a segment called “Trendspotting-
Youthquake,” Demetri Martin interviewed Itay Hod from CBS News about the tactics 
political candidates need to use to reach young voters. Had says that as opposed to speaking 
logically and rationally to young voters about issues, “the more graphics you have on the 
screen, the more appealing it is to kids” (Stewart, 2008). Additionally, candidates need to 
“learn how to speak their language,” which according to Had includes saying “What’s up?” 
instead of “Hey, you’ve got to vote for Obama” (Stewart, 2008). The scene then shifts to a 
group of “correspondents” as they relentlessly and fruitlessly ask young people at a bar about 
their political opinions (Stewart, 2008). 
 It seems commonplace now for news and entertainment programming to address or 
poke fun at young voters’ low levels of political knowledge. While there are a few studies on 
the effects of late-night humor about politicians on young voters’ attitudes (e.g., 
Baumgartner, 2007; Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; 2008; Young; 2004; 2006), there is little 
research to date examining the effects of political humor about young voters on young voters. 
Articles written by young people during the election indicate an awareness of the way their 
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age group is portrayed in the press and perceived by the public. In an opinion piece to the 
Raleigh News and Observer, Ph.D. student Justin Martin noted, “Oh, how common are 
lamentations about young Americans’ lack of political knowledge. Young people in this 
country, we often hear, are abysmally uninformed and would rather punch messages on i-
Phones, listen to MP3s or hit bunker shots on a Wii than consume political news” (Martin, 
2008, para. 1). Richard Wood, a columnist for the University of South Carolina’s paper The 
Daily Gamecock, wrote, “What good is it to encourage young people to vote if they don’t 
know much about the candidates or their positions? Or what if they lack an even more basic 
knowledge of how American government works?” (Wood, 2008, para. 3). While these 
anecdotes are interesting, little systematic evidence exists to determine if or how negative 
portrayals of young voters in humorous and non-humorous outlets affect young voters. This 
research seeks to fill that void in the literature.  
 For political scientists and scholars of political communication, the representation of 
voters as politically inept has serious implications. Delli Carpini (1999, p. 6) argued that the 
continued recitation of the notion of an ill-informed public has detrimental effects:  
Books such as Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the American Mind (1987), 
Diane Ravitch’s and Chester Finn’s What Do Our 17-Year-Olds Know? 
(1987), and E. D. Hirsch’s Cultural Literacy (1988) have also contributed 
to our negative image of the American public.1 Indeed, D. Charles 
Whitney and Ellen Wartella conclude that a ‘virtual cottage industry has 
arisen in the past few years in making out the American public as a bunch 
of ignoramuses’ (1989, p. 99). This characterization is so well-established 
that, according to John Ferejohn, ‘Nothing strikes the student of public 
opinion and democracy more forcefully than the paucity of information 
most people posses about politics’ (Ferejohn, 1990, p. 3). 
 
                                                
1 Three more recent examples of these books are Richard Shenkman’s Just How Stupid Are 
We? (2008), Mark Bauerlein’s The Dumbest Generation (2008), and Susan Jacoby’s The Age 
of American Unreason (2008). 
4 
 As a review of the literature will attest, many scholars are particularly concerned 
about the effects of political humor on young voters, as this generation increasingly turns to 
late-night comedy for political information. In a national survey conducted by the Pew 
Internet and Life Project (Pew, 2004), 44% of young people ages 18-29 reported at least 
sometimes if not regularly learning about the presidential campaign and the candidates from 
late-night shows such as The Late Show with David Letterman or The Tonight Show with Jay 
Leno, while 50% of this age demographic reported the same for comedy shows such as The 
Daily Show with Jon Stewart or Saturday Night Live. As young voters are exposed to 
disparaging humor about their age group, they may come to learn how little is expected of 
them. The question is whether exposure to disparaging political humor has different effects 
on young voters’ attitudes and behaviors than exposure to non-humorous disparagement or 
whether either has any effect at all.  
 This research tested whether exposure to nearly identical disparaging messages told 
in a humorous or non-humorous manner had different effects on young voters’ political 
attitudes and performance on a political knowledge test, using the growing psychological 
literature on stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995) as its theoretical foundation. This 
theory states that when presented with threatening information about the stereotypical 
inability of one’s group to perform a skill, one tends to perform in accordance with that 
stereotype to a greater degree than one would without exposure to the threat. While young 
people are disparaged for performing poorly on political knowledge tests, this research 
sought to determine if exposure to such disparagement actually causes poor performance. 
Young voters’ level of political knowledge is an important object of study because it is 
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strongly correlated with positive civic outcomes, including voting (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 
1996). 
 One of the reasons why performance may decrease upon exposure to disparaging 
messages may be due to decreased self-esteem. There is some research to suggest that one of 
the reasons young people do not vote in greater numbers is that they lack political 
information efficacy, or the feeling that they know enough to participate in politics. Using 
national survey data from 2000 and 2002, Kaid, McKinney, and Tedesco (2007) found that 
confidence in one’s level of political knowledge accounted for a small but significant amount 
of the variance (between 6% and 10%) in determining whether a young voter would turn up 
at the polls. Therefore, this research examined the effects of exposure to disparaging 
messages on political information efficacy.  
 Although young voters are disparaged in humorous and non-humorous outlets for 
their often unreliable, uninspired and uninformed civic behavior, little evidence exists that 
this disparagement causes apathetic attitudes or inhibits civic participation. To understand 
why these portrayals could affect young voters, one first needs to understand the literature on 
the effects of political humor. Second, to test whether messages about young voters’ low 
levels of political knowledge affect their attitudes and behaviors, one must review the 
literature on stereotype threat.  
Political Humor 
 Throughout recorded history, the effects and functions of humor have been the 
subject of great debate. As young voters turn to late-night shows for political information, 
scholars continue to study the effects of political humor. How large or negative an influence 
is exposure to political humor on democracy in general or on young voters in particular?  
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 Plato (Philebus 48-50, cited in Morreall, 1987, p. 11) argued that laughter and humor 
provide us with feelings of superiority that rational humans should not experience. In 
laughing at politicians’ mistakes or at the foibles of the press, we erroneously imagine 
ourselves to be better persons.  The superiority theory of humor, as it is referred to in the 
literature, gained prominence in the work of Thomas Hobbes. In summary of his treatise, he 
wrote, “the passion of laughter is nothing else but the sudden glory arising from some sudden 
conception of some eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or 
with our own formerly…” (Hobbes, 1840, summarized in Morreall, 1987, p. 19). One of the 
main criticisms of contemporary political humor is that the targets of ridicule are often 
elected officials or government institutions, and exposure to this type of humor may create a 
cynical, distrustful, or perhaps apathetic citizenry. Hart and Hartelius (2007) argue that Jon 
Stewart in particular makes being cynical popular. Through mockery of the political system, 
Stewart invites viewers to unite behind his anti-political diatribes. As a unified group of 
cynics, his audience holds an imagined sense of superiority over the political sphere they 
mock. It is quite plausible that people who watch late-night political humor shows enjoy the 
camaraderie and feelings of superiority associated with the constant disparagement of the 
political process at the expense of more positive civic participation. 
 There is scant empirical data about the effects of political humor on political attitudes. 
The studies that do exist often employ surveys, thus leaving open the issue of causality. In an 
exploration of political humor on the Internet, Baumgartner (2007) had survey participants at 
two universities answer questions about their use of Internet humor sites (e.g., jibjab.com) 
and their attitudes about politics and government. He found that participants who reported 
visiting these sites regularly were more likely to express feelings of political distrust. 
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Whether exposure to political humor caused these feelings could not be determined through 
use of a survey.  
 There are some experiments that purport to show negative effects of political humor 
on citizens’ attitudes. Baumgartner and Morris (2006) randomly assigned participants to 
watch either eight minutes of edited jokes or news about President George W. Bush and John 
Kerry or no video (control group). The authors found that exposure to jokes about 
presidential candidates made participants more cynical, and paradoxically, more efficacious 
about politics. The weakness of this design is that the degree of equivalence between the two 
stimuli is questionable. It is unclear what about the humorous material affected the 
participants. Among the potential factors are the messages themselves, the presence of 
audience laughter, and the expectation of humor that comes with attention to late-night 
shows. Baumgartner and Morris (2006) note that the degree of equivalence is merely 
“adequate” (p. 348).  
 Similarly, Baumgartner and Morris (2008) had participants answer questions about 
their attitudes towards both political parties after watching a series of clips of either The 
Colbert Report (TCR), the show it was fashioned after, The O’Reilly Factor, or watching no 
clips (control group). While the subject of the clips was similar between the two programs, 
the language, delivery and technical features of the clips contained numerous differences. 
Still, noting a significantly higher level of self-reported trust in Republicans after viewing a 
series of clips from TCR as opposed to the no video control group, the authors surmised that, 
“Exposure to TCR is positively associated with one’s tendency to agree that they trust the 
Republicans in Congress to do the right thing” (p. 632). As should be evident, it is not 
necessarily the show itself that causes these attitudes but the types and topics of humor 
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present on late-night shows, along with variables such as audience laughter, visual cues, and 
humor expectancy.  
 In addition to creating a culture of cynicism, critics of humor note that disparaging 
jokes often rely on stereotypes, and thus contribute to misunderstandings and social division 
(Berger, 1993). Janes and Olson (2000) provide a general definition of disparagement humor 
as “any humor that derogates or provides negative information about someone or something” 
(p. 474). Ferguson and Ford (2008) define disparaging humor as, “remarks that (are intended 
to) elicit amusement through the denigration, derogation, or belittlement of a given target 
(e.g., individuals, social groups, political ideologies, material possessions) (pp. 283-284). The 
comic conception of groups based on exaggeration and caricature is theorized to likely 
continue to foster the “isms” of race, class, gender, age and American isolation (Ross & 
York, 2007). If this is correct, then exposure to disparaging humor about their age group may 
influence young citizens’ self-perception, though prior to the present research little empirical 
evidence exists to support this idea. 
 Most of the research in this area examines the effects of disparaging humor about 
others on one’s attitude towards the group being disparaged. For instance, Olson, Maio and 
Hobden (1999) found virtually no relationship between exposure to disparaging humor and 
the accessibility or extremity of stereotypical beliefs as compared to exposure to neutral 
humor or non-humorous disparagement, although the targets of the humor in their 
experiments were socially accepted as powerful, men and lawyers. However, Ford and 
Ferguson (2004) found that exposure to disparaging humor resulted in an increased 
acceptance of discrimination, particularly for people already prejudiced in some way. 
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 Contemporary critics also argue that in addition to creating cynical citizens, laughing 
about society’s problems may release the energy needed to motivate people to actually solve 
them (Purdie, 1993). According to the relief or catharsis theory of humor, most commonly 
attributed to the work of Sigmund Freud (1905/1960), humor serves as a means of expressing 
hostile feelings in a socially acceptable manner. Laughter and smiling, the physical 
manifestations of the enjoyment of humor, are physiological responses to the dissipation of 
psychological tension. It is possible that following these cathartic responses to humor, people 
are less inclined to give serious thought to the substance of the message behind the jokes. 
Therefore, laughing at disparaging humor about oneself or a group to which one belongs 
might diminish the recipient’s motivation to take any action to correct whatever fault was 
highlighted in the joke. 
 However, data indicate that rather than giving up on politics, citizens exposed to late-
night political humor are likely to subsequently seek out more traditional news coverage. 
Feldman and Young (2008) examined a series of cross sectional surveys from the National 
Annenberg Election Survey (NAES) to assess the relationship between late-night viewership 
and traditional news viewership. After controlling for demographic variables, the researchers 
found increased attention to late-night humor (Leno, Letterman, or The Daily Show) was 
positively associated with a subsequent increase in attention to traditional campaign 
coverage. Young and Tisinger (2006) and Cao and Brewer (2008) reported similar findings 
using Pew and NAES data, respectively.   
 In an experiment, Xenos and Becker (2009) tested whether exposure to humorous 
information about an issue resulted in greater information-seeking behavior or learning than 
exposure to a “more serious” version of that information. Subjects watched a 5-minute clip 
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constructed by the experimenters from nightly newscasts about the troop surge in Iraq, and/or 
a 5-minute clip from The Daily Show that “featured much of the same footage” as the news 
broadcasts (Xenos & Becker, 2009, p. 321). Participants were then given the opportunity to 
use a web browser to read stories about Iraq and foreign policy, domestic issues, sports, or 
entertainment after watching the clip. Participants who watched the comedy clip tended to 
spend more time reading stories about Iraq and foreign policy than the other groups, leading 
the authors to give moderate support to the idea that humor can act as a gateway to greater 
information seeking. However, once again the degree of equivalence between the two sets of 
stimuli is questionable. 
 Not all philosophers and scholars see humor as detrimental to democracy and 
discourse (For a review of philosopher’s thoughts on humor throughout the 18th and 19th 
centuries, see Morreall, 1987). For example, Kant (1892/1987) argued that rather than 
attending to humor to feel relieved of the need to act or to feel good about oneself in relation 
to others, people are often amused and prone to laughter when contrary or seemingly 
incompatible ideas are juxtaposed. The incongruity theory of humor posits that laugher 
results from a violation of expectations, which may be manifest in surprise, in wordplay, or 
in creative juxtaposition. Contemporary proponents of political humor argue that in attending 
to comedic messages, people are engaging in creative and critical thinking, exploring new 
ways of understanding the world, and may, as a result, find themselves motivated to learn 
more or engage with the issue involved (Bennett, 2007; Hariman, 2007; 2008). For instance, 
when Jon Stewart plays a series of edited video clips of politicians making contradictory 
statements side by side, the audience may learn while it laughs. While the lesson learned 
from exposure to such a series of clips might influence one’s opinions of a particular 
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politician in a negative manner, the act of learning from political humor can be a positive 
democratic outcome.  
 The idea that exposure to political humor can lead to positive outcomes such as 
increased political knowledge has received some attention in the form of survey research. In 
2004, the Annenberg Public Policy Center found that survey respondents who indicated 
watching The Daily Show in the week prior answered an average of 3.59 out of six political 
knowledge questions correctly, as compared to 2.62 for people who watched no late-night 
shows that week, and 2.91 and 2.95 for those who reported watching Letterman and Leno, 
respectively (NAES, 2004). Similarly, a 2007 report from Pew found that 54% of regular 
Daily Show viewers scored in the high knowledge group (answering at least 15 out of 23 
political knowledge questions correctly), as compared with 35% of the general population, 
38% of regular network news viewers, and 43% of regularly daily newspaper readers (Pew, 
2007). Using Pew data, Cao (2008) found that young people who regularly watched late-
night shows scored modestly higher on the political knowledge questions than non-regular 
viewers. However, the four “political knowledge” questions pulled from the Pew data dealt 
with candidate familiarity more than knowledge per se. Also using Pew data, Hollander 
(2005) found that viewing late-night programming contributed a small degree to recognition 
but not recall of campaign information. It is unclear from these survey data the degree to 
which watching late-night humor caused an increase in political knowledge or whether those 
who scored higher on such tests tended to watch these shows.  
 There are other reasons to believe that humor can be a powerful force for good. In 
bringing to light the incongruities in politics, humor can show us the way life ought to be. 
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Nachman (2004) details the careers of comedians such as Mort Sahl and Lenny Bruce, who 
challenged the status quo in the 1950s and 1960s with their aggressive brand of humor. 
Satirists maintain a critical distance from the newsmakers often too familiar with ways of 
manipulating the traditional press (Baym, 2005, p. 265). In the words of author Murray 
Davis, “Satire, in short, focuses on social units that fall short of their ideal” (Davis, 1993, p. 
219). In Peterson’s (2008) opinion, satire can “raise awareness,” “function as democracy’s 
feedback loop,” and “sound the alarm” about problems with its targets, be they the 
government, private industry, the press, or members of the public (p. 19). Similarly, Gray, 
Jones, and Thompson (2009) argue that satire is “provocative” and “empowering” (p. 13).  
Furthermore, while not everyone is interested in understanding the finer points of political 
arguments, many people can enjoy and engage in political humor, thus broadening the public 
sphere to include voices and audiences that otherwise would be disenfranchised (Hariman, 
2008). 
 Contemporary scholars of political communication and political science remain 
divided over whether exposure to political humor benefits or harms positive democratic 
outcomes such as level of political knowledge, political attitudes, or voting intention. 
According to the relief theory, people expend their energy being entertained instead of being 
active in the expression of hostility through laughter, while the superiority theory predicts 
that humor is a likely cause of citizen apathy and disdain for politics and a source of social 
divisions. On the other hand, the incongruity theory posits that exposure to political humor 
can increase political knowledge.  
 There is some evidence from surveys and experiments that exposure to political 
humor is associated with and perhaps increases both political knowledge and political 
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information-seeking behaviors. There is scant yet mixed evidence about the effects of 
exposure to political humor on attitudes towards politics and one’s own ability to affect 
change.  
 The majority of the research on the subject is based on survey data, leaving open the 
question of whether exposure to political humor affects political knowledge or political 
attitudes or whether these variables influence people’s interest in and exposure to political 
humor. Additionally, the stimuli used to assess the effects of political humor in experimental 
research tend to have numerous differences in their humorous vs. non-humorous stimuli, 
making comparisons between groups suspect.  
 Next, studies about the effects of political humor fail to take into account the idea that 
people tend to approach humor with a different mindset. In other words, when people tune in 
to political humor, they are more likely to expect to be entertained. Wouldn’t the effect of 
humorous messages about young citizens or politicians be different if the humorous intent of 
the speaker was cued in advance? If a humorous mindset leads to dismissal of disparaging 
messages, then negative portrayals of groups on late-night humor programs may not be as 
harmful as originally thought.  
Humor Expectancy 
 Literature in psychology suggests that expectations can influence the way information 
is interpreted and even unconsciously taken in through the senses (e.g., Balcetis & Dunning, 
2006). For instance, according to the Affective Expectation Model (Wilson, Lisle, Kraft & 
Wetzel, 1989), our beliefs about how much we will like or dislike an impending event are 
key determinants of how we experience and interpret the event. Unless a discrepancy 
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between expectation and reality is noticed, people will assimilate their attitudes in line with 
their expectations. (Geers & Lassiter, 2005).   
 Similarly, it is thought that people engage in different types of information processing 
when cues about the impending presence of humor are evident. Research indicates that 
people may disregard a message that is unclear or incongruous when made to interpret that 
information in a playful way (McGhee, 1972). Likewise, any perceived threat can be 
interpreted playfully and dismissed when the humorous mindset is activated (Zillmann, 
1983). Research by Pexman and colleagues (Katz & Pexman, 1997; Pexman & Olineck, 
2002) found that information was more likely to be interpreted ironically if presented from a 
humorous source. Similarly, Nabi, Moyer Guse, and Byrne (2007) found that messages about 
social issues purportedly from comedian Chris Rock were judged to be funnier than the same 
messages from an anonymous source. Increased perception of humorousness resulted in 
reduced counterarguing, deeper processing and increased message discounting as reported in 
post-test measures.  
 This research adds to the literature on the effects of humor expectancy. Cues that 
forthcoming information will be humorous will affect how information is processed in at 
least three measurable ways. First, the expectation of humor will result in an increased desire 
to “get the joke,” thus leading people to give the information that follows greater attention. 
Second, people expect humor to be “based on truth,” and thus will tend to accept the 
message’s underlying meaning with less counterarguing than they would without the 
expectation of humor. Third, people made to expect humor will be more likely to dismiss 
threatening information as “just a joke.” Concerns about the negative effects of political 
humor, in this case disparaging humor about young people, may be supported if people are 
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shown to give greater attention and credence to information that they believed was going to 
be funny, and negated if it is shown that the expectation of humor reduces or eliminates the 
impact of the message on political attitudes and behaviors through message dismissal. 
 Finally, little research to date has assessed the effects of humor about young voters on 
young voters. It seems plausible that the type of humor most likely to affect young voters’ 
political attitudes and voting intentions would be that which addresses young voters’ ability 
to function as proper citizens. As newcomers to the world of political participation, young 
voters may be particularly influenced by negative humor about their age group. Hertlzer 
(1970) wrote that, “When newcomers are in the process of assimilation in a new community 
of society, the individuals try to avoid being laughed at because of their ignorance or 
clumsiness” (pp. 162-63).  
Stereotype Threat 
 One way to test whether messages about a group of people affect members of that 
group is through a theory called stereotype threat. Stereotype threat theory (Steele, 1997; 
Steele & Aronson, 1995) posits that when one’s membership in a negatively stereotyped 
group is made salient, one tends to inadvertently confirm the stereotype. Stereotype threat 
theory builds off research in social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), which predicts 
that when a group to which one belongs is threatened by comparison with a superior group, 
one actively works to minimize the negative and restore positive in-group distinctiveness. 
Stereotype threat theory states that this added motivation and stress actually inhibit 
performance. Acknowledgement of the threat to one’s identity tends to result in a self-
fulfilling prophecy. Self-fulfilling prophecies occur when “people hold expectancies that lead 
them to alter their behavior which in turn causes the expected behaviors to be exhibited by 
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people who are targets of the expectancies” (Hilton & von Hippel, 1996, p. 244). In other 
words, people behave in accordance with the salient expectations of how they will behave.  
 The most frequent subjects of stereotype threat research are women and minorities. 
There exists an “achievement gap” in applied settings between how these groups perform in 
comparison to men and white people, respectively. For instance, the initial study (Steele & 
Aronson, 1995) focused on the stereotype that African Americans do not perform as well on 
IQ tests as their white counterparts. Researchers are interested in identifying the causes of 
these gaps and any remedies for reducing them. The stereotype of young voters also has 
applied and as yet unexplored implications. This research will examine if young voters 
experience stereotype threat effects when exposed to political humor about their 
stereotypically low levels of political knowledge. 
 While there are scattered criticisms of the theory, particularly in the way results are 
reported in the press (e.g., Sackett, Hardison, & Cullen, 2004) and general real world 
applicability (e.g., Cullen, Hardison, & Sackett, 2004; Cullen, Waters, & Sackett, 2006), the 
majority of articles serve as extensions and refinements of the original study (Steele & 
Aronson, 1995). Sometimes journalists report that the gap between, say, African Americans 
and Caucasian Americans is eliminated in the absence of stereotype threat, or that the 
removal of stereotype threat would be a panacea for the stereotyped group. The research 
tends to more specifically indicate only that the stereotyped group performs better than it 
does in the absence of that threat. In other words, the gap between the performance of the 
stereotyped and the majority group often still exists in the absence of threat, though it may be 
reduced.  Furthermore, scholars readily acknowledge that there are larger societal issues at 
play that cause these stereotypes to exist. Similarly, it is unclear whether or how frequently 
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people are primed about or asked to give information about their affiliation with a 
stereotyped group before taking tests such as the SAT, GRE, etc., leading skeptics to 
question the generalizability of the studies’ findings. Even with these criticisms 
acknowledged, what Steele and Aronson (1995) found, and researchers in the fields of 
gender (e.g., Cadinu, Maass, Lombardo & Frigerio, 2006; Marx & Stapel, 2006; McGlone, 
Aronson & Kobrynowicz, 2006), race (e.g., Shih, Ambady, Richeson, & Fujita, 2002; Stone, 
Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999), and age (senior citizens) (e.g., Abrams, Eller, & Bryant, 
2006; Andreolleti & Lachman, 2004; Chasteen, Bhattacharyya, Horhota, Tam, & Hasher, 
2005) have confirmed, is that stereotype threat can create a significant amount of variation in 
performance on measures where people feel threatened about what their performance will say 
about themselves and their group.  
 The vast majority of studies on stereotype threat examine the effects on performance 
on math tests. Among the other dependent variables used in stereotype threat research are 
scores on social sensitivity in men (Koenig & Eagly, 2005), political knowledge in women 
(McGlone et al., 2006), ability to balance (Chalabaev, Stone, Sarrazin, & Croizet, 2008) and 
performance at soccer (Chalabaev, Sarrazin, Stone, & Cury, 2008) and golf (Stone et al., 
1999; Stone & McWhinnie, 2008).   
 The way threat is manipulated in stereotype threat research varies widely. For 
instance, Steele and Aronson (1995) had half of their African American participants select 
their race from a list before beginning their math test, thus subtly making that part of their 
identity more salient. Having participants select their age (“18-24/young voter”) prior to 
taking part in a political knowledge test may similarly make that part of their identity more 
salient, resulting in a decrease in performance. Other ways of inducing feelings of threat 
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include having women take a test with a group of men present (Inzlicht & Ben Zeev, 2000), 
placing a derogatory cartoon about women’s math skills in the room with women as they 
took a test (Oswald and Harvey, 2000/2001), and varying the race and gender of the 
experimenter (Marx & Goff, 2005; Stone & McWhinnie, 2008).  
 Another way of creating threat is by telling participants that the test they are about to 
take is a powerful and reliable diagnostic tool, one whose results will reveal something 
important about the test taker. By increasing the perceived diagnosticity of the test, theorists 
argue that stereotype threat effects are more likely to occur (Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, & 
Hart, 2004; Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001; Marx, Stapel, & Muller, 2005; Steele & 
Aronson, 1995).  
 Although the results continue to be replicated, the precise mechanisms of the theory 
remain unclear. This review details several of the purported mediators and moderators of 
stereotype threat effects. Although calls for greater attention to the mediating factors in 
stereotype threat research are often made, studies employing mediational designs produce 
non-significant or even contradictory results (Smith, 2004). Generally, theorists take the 
position that task achievement is challenged when people are cognitively or affectively 
occupied. In their summary of the literature, Schmader, Johns, and Forbes (2008) note that 
whatever the mechanism (e.g., stress, self monitoring, counterarguing), the underlying 
phenomenon causing inhibited performance may be a reduction in working memory capacity.  
 One of the most frequently used mediators examined in stereotype threat research is 
anxiety. It would seem that the natural and most observable response to a threat would be 
anxiety. However, as frequently as it is used, results indicate a lack of consistent evidence 
that self-reported anxiety levels mediate stereotype threat effects (Aronson, Quinn, & 
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Spencer, 1998; Osborne, 2001; Spencer, Steele, & Quinn, 1999; Steele & Aronson, 1995; 
Stone et al., 1999). For instance, Aronson et al. (1998) found that although participants in a 
stereotype threat condition did perform worse on a math test than participants in a no threat 
condition, there was no difference in the level of state anxiety between conditions. However, 
Osborne (2001) found that controlling for state anxiety did reduce the differences in scores 
between black and white math test takers and also between male and female test takers.  
 Although not frequently used as a mediator in stereotype threat research, message 
counterarguing may cause performance detriments. In accordance with the working memory 
model, counterarguing increases cognitive load thus leading to decreased performance on a 
task requiring cognition (For research on cognitive load manipulation effects, see for 
example Gilbert & Hixon, 1991; Pontari & Schlenker, 2000). 
 Another mediator of interest is motivation/effort (Aronson et al., 1999; Beilock, 
Rydell, & McConnell, 2007; Jamieson & Harkins, 2007; Osborne, 2007; Schmader & Johns, 
2003; Stone, 2002). On the one hand, decreased effort may be a sign of self-handicapping 
(Stone, 2002). People may give up on a task as a means of protecting themselves from the 
possibility of performing poorly on a task that is important to their identity. Stone (2002) 
found that participants who cared about sports practiced golf swings for an upcoming task for 
far less time when under stereotype threat.  
 Too much motivation can also inhibit performance, through what is commonly 
referred to as “choking” (Baumeister, 1984). Although it might seem that trying harder on a 
test would correlate with higher test scores, some researchers posit that too much pressure to 
act appropriately or diminish the feeling of threat can interfere with optimal performance, as 
when a basketball player misses clutch free throws.  
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 The final mediator of interest to the present research is attitudes about the self, in this 
case political information efficacy. However, in prior research self-esteem was not found to 
mediate the relationship between stereotyping and performance detriments in elderly people 
(Levy & Langer, 1994) or between gender and performance on a math test (Heatherton & 
Polivy, 1991).  
 In addition to mediating variables, scholars are interested in understanding the 
individual differences that predict how people will react to stereotype threat. The moderators 
of most interest here are the related concepts of group and domain/topic identification, belief 
and awareness of the stereotype, and overall efficacy. Domain identification refers to the 
degree to which a person feels that the topic or issue being stereotyped is important to his or 
her sense of self. For instance, performance on a math test may be a more important domain 
for some people than for others. Some research indicates that stronger identification with a 
group or domain/topic being threatened will result in more dramatic effects (e.g., Aronson et 
al., 1999; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992; Schmader, 2002; Smith & White, 2002). However, 
other research indicates that simply priming or exposing individuals to cues about groups 
with stereotypes can influence individuals’ behavior in accordance with that stereotype (e.g., 
Ambady, Pail, Steele, Owen-Smith, & Mitchell, 2004; Bergeron, Block, & Echtenkamp, 
2006; Levy, 1996). These studies find that one does not necessarily need to belong to or feel 
a close sense of affiliation with a stereotyped group or domain for effects to occur. In terms 
of belief and awareness of the stereotype, research does indicate that being “chronically self 
conscious” of the stereotype in question may moderate the strength of stereotype threat 
effects (Brown & Pinel, 2003; Pinel, 1999). Finally, one’s overall sense of confidence, or 
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efficacy (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) may influence the way that stereotype threat effects 
influence a person’s attitudes or behaviors.  
 As noted, the most frequently used dependent variable in stereotype threat research is 
performance on a math test. The present research focuses on political knowledge as its 
outcome variable of interest, though it is not the first to do so (McGlone et al., 2006). If 
stereotype threat is found to affect young voters’ attitudes and performance on a political 
knowledge test, then interventions could be designed to prevent or reduce these effects. For 
instance, stereotype threat effects can be reduced by having people think about what makes 
them an individual, separate from the group (Ambady et al., 2004). McGlone et al. (2006) 
determined that having women focus on another part of their identity (e.g., where they were 
from) reduced the effects of stereotype threat. If political knowledge and attitudes are 
affected by negative portrayals of young voters, it is possible that encouraging newcomers to 
the political sphere to think of themselves in terms other than “young voters” may reduce 
stereotype effects.  
 Stereotype threat research is related to a larger stream of inquiry in psychology, 
wherein subjects’ attitudes and behaviors are influenced by exposure to subliminal or 
supraliminal information. It is argued that information that precedes an object or behavior 
can “prime” the way one feels toward that object or conducts that behavior. The outcomes 
may change in accordance with the prime (e.g., performing better on a knowledge test after 
being primed with “professor”), or in opposition to the prime (e.g., performing worse on the 
test after being primed with “Einstein”). Attitudinal or behavioral assimilation is said to 
occur when people’s attitudes or behaviors are found to be in closer alignment with the 
prime. On the other hand, when people’s behavior is diametrically opposite from that 
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expected by exposure to a prime, contrast effects are said to have occurred (Dijksterhuis, 
Spears, Postmes, Stapel, Koomen, von Knippenberg, & Scheepers, 1998). Research indicates 
that exposure to trait primes or stereotypes (professor) often leads to assimilation effects 
(better performance, e.g., Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996), whereas exposure to exemplar 
primes (Einstein) leads to contrast effects (worse performance, e.g., Dijksterhuis et al., 1998). 
The present research contributes to the literature on assimilation effects by testing whether 
general stereotypical information about young voters’ stereotypical low levels of political 
knowledge affects their behavior in accordance with that stereotype.  
Political Knowledge and Political Information Efficacy 
 Virtually every journal article and book chapter dealing with political knowledge 
includes a statement about the importance of this concept as an indicator of a healthy 
democracy. For instance, Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954) argued, “The democratic 
citizen is expected to be well-informed about political affairs. He is supposed to know what 
the issues are, what their history is, what the relevant facts are, what alternatives are 
proposed, what the party stands for, what the likely consequences are” (p. 308).  According 
to this early philosophy, it is imperative that as proper citizens, people be as well informed 
about as many issues as possible.  
 When we say that someone is politically knowledgeable, what do we mean? As 
Shenkman (2008) argues “If, say, half the respondents do not know that the Constitution was 
drafted in Philadelphia, as happens to be the case, does that entitle one to conclude that The 
People are stupid? Or is a higher percentage required –say, 51 percent? And if we are to 
grade the public in this manner, what shall we say constitutes a passing or failing grade?” 
(p.16).  Mondak and Davis (2001) offered four “levels” of political knowledge: 
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(1) fully informed (i.e., the respondent truly does know the answer to our 
question); (2) partially informed (the respondent either possesses an 
incomplete understanding, or the respondent can rule out an incorrect choice 
option on a multiple-choice item); (3) misinformed (the respondent believes 
he or she knows the correct answer, but is mistaken); and (4) uninformed (the 
respondent holds no knowledge pertinent to the question) (p. 201, 202). 
 
 Throughout the 1950s, researchers refrained from studying political knowledge more 
thoroughly for several reasons (Lambert, Curtis, Kay, & Brown, 1988). First, the earliest 
voting studies found low levels of political knowledge as it was measured among 
respondents (Berelson et al., 1954; Campbell, Converse, Miller & Stokes, 1960; Campbell, 
Gurin & Miller, 1954; Campbell & Kahn, 1952; Lazarsfeld, Berelson & Gaudet, 1944), and 
an insignificant correlation was evident between these levels and either overall attitudes 
towards politics or political behaviors. Through interviews and surveys of voters in 
Michigan, Campbell and colleagues (1952, 1960) found that few people knew a lot about 
politics, about half knew enough to answer basic questions, while the rest knew little at all. 
Worse still, the percentage of people falling into the latter category was growing, particularly 
among young people. With low levels of political knowledge and insignificant relationships 
between the concept and other attitudes and behaviors, this area of research was mostly 
abandoned.  
 A second reason is also cited for the decrease in the study of political knowledge. In 
order to maintain a respectful relationship with participants, researchers refrained from 
posing questions about what people knew about politics for fear that this could demoralize or 
confuse participants and hinder their willingness to answer other questions (Lambert et al., 
1988). To compensate for this belief, some researchers prefaced their questions with 
statements such as, “Many people are unfamiliar with <insert issue or politician>.” 
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 A final reason focused on research designs. It was believed that people who may not 
have any real opinion or knowledge about an issue may feel inclined to give an opinion 
anyway, what Neuman (1986) called a “pseudo opinion” (p. 22), either to satisfy their desire 
to please the researcher or to feel better about themselves. 
 Although political knowledge became the focus of scholarly research again in the 
1980s, to this day ways to measure political knowledge remain in serious dispute. Zaller 
(1990) wrote, “variables purporting to measure ‘political awareness,’ ‘political expertise,’ 
‘political sophistication,’ ‘cognitive sophistication,’ ‘political information,’ ‘political 
involvement,’ ‘media exposure,’ and ‘political interest’ appear regularly in the public opinion 
literature and are used (along with education) more or less interchangeably to explain the 
same family of dependent variables” (p. 126). Kuklinksi and Quirk (2001) described the 
creative ways scholars assess citizens’ political knowledge (competence in their language): 
They have considered whether citizens hold consistent positions across 
issues; whether they hold stable positions across time; whether they know 
relevant facts from a policy debate; whether they maintain their positions 
when given different framings of the same issue; whether their preferences 
are correlated with their values; whether their preferences resemble those 
of others who are well informed; and whether they effectively take cues 
from parties, politicians, interest group, and other citizens (Kuklinski & 
Quirk, 2001, p.286). 
 
 
 A lot of research focuses on political knowledge trends, with a goal of identifying if 
there are significant differences between generations or groups of people (e.g. Delli Carpini 
& Keeter, 1991; Jennings, 1996). Ideally, researchers would be able to compare levels of 
political knowledge across generations and between groups of people. However, researchers 
often fail to use items that allow for these comparisons. For instance, Jennings (1996) divided 
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knowledge. For textbook knowledge, he included measures about government mechanics 
such as, “About how many years does a U.S. Senator serve? Do you happen to know how 
many members there are on the United States Supreme Court?” These are consistent 
measures of political knowledge. As measures of surveillance or “current events” knowledge, 
he asked, “Marshall Tito is a leader of what country? Who is governor of [name of state] 
now?” Finally, to assess historical knowledge he asked, “Do you happen to remember 
whether President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was a Republican or a Democrat? During 
World War II, which nation had a great many concentration camps for Jews? Who succeeded 
John Kennedy as president? Do you know a country that borders on North or South 
Vietnam?” As is evident, the current events are subject to changes over time, and the 
historical questions become more and more distant to each generation. 
 At the most basic level, political knowledge is an understanding of “what government 
is and does” (Barber, 1969, p. 38). To be politically knowledgeable, one must know “the 
basic structure of government – its basic values, such as citizen participation, majority rule, 
separation of powers, civil liberties, and its basic elements, such as the two-party system, the 
two houses of Congress, the role of the judiciary, and the organization of the cabinet” 
(Neuman, 1986, p. 186). Delli Carpini and Keeter (1993) surveyed political scientists to 
assess what was believed to be important for the average citizen to know about politics. The 
“essential” and “important” topics to political scientists were 1) institutions and processes, 2) 
issues and policies, 3) history, and 4) current political alignments.  
  In any given study, the conceptualization and measurement of a concept such as 
political knowledge are open to the interpretation of the author. While there is certainly a 
large amount of subjectivity of opinion with regard to issues, there also exist certain 
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undeniable truths. Knowledge for the purposes of this paper refers to the accumulation of 
proven, objective facts and concepts. Therefore, a core measure of political knowledge must 
include awareness or recognition of political parties or of candidates, the mechanics of 
government, and cognizance of personally relevant issues (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1993). 
(See Appendix A for scale).  
 There is serious debate about whether political knowledge as measured this way 
accurately reflects what a person knows about politics, or whether it is important for a 
functioning citizenry. First, measuring political knowledge as a collection of facts limits the 
way we define a knowledgeable citizen. People are often able to make accurate decisions in 
their own best interest with limited information, using cues or heuristics such as party 
affiliation when making political judgments (Brady & Sniderman, 1985; Popkin, 1991). 
Whether or not someone can name the Secretary of State may not say much about his or her 
level of political interest or involvement. In addition, other outcomes (political talk, 
volunteerism, democratic imaginations) may be even more valuable (Perrin, 2006), but are 
less easily quantified or measured in experiments. This research does not make the case that 
political knowledge as measured is a valid construct, only that as a carefully crafted, 
standardized product, it might reveal some quantifiable difference between groups of people.  
 In addition to measuring political knowledge, this research examined the effect of 
exposure to disparaging political statements on young citizens’ perceived level of political 
knowledge. Confidence in one’s abilities to perform the functions of a citizen may be just as 
important an indicator of likely civic behavior as more objectively measured political 
knowledge.  
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 Political efficacy is defined as “the feeling that individual political action does have 
or can have an impact upon the political process…”(Campbell, Gurin & Miller, 1954, p. 
187). Kaid, McKinney, and Tedesco (2007) recently developed a related scale to assess how 
confident people are in their level of political knowledge. Kaid et al. (2007) state that political 
information efficacy, “focuses soles on the voter’s confidence in his or her own political 
knowledge and its sufficiency to engage in the political process (to vote)” (p. 1096). These 
authors found that “young voters who do not feel confident in their knowledge levels are less 
likely to vote than those who feel more confident” (p. 1103). Other research indicates that 
confidence in one’s abilities is strongly related to political participation. Solhaug (2006) 
found that self-efficacy, knowledge, and motivation all have significant impacts on young 
people’s political participation and political attitudes. Bandura (1986; 1997) found a strong 
positive correlation between a person’s level of efficacy and his or her participation in 
politics. Similarly, McClusky, Deshpande, Shah & McLeod (2004) found that the size of the 
“gap” between a person’s desired and perceived level of efficacy influenced whether he or 
she was politically active. 
 Political knowledge and political information efficacy may be strong predictors of 
political engagement. To this point there has been little research comparing performance on a 
political knowledge test with political information efficacy scores. As a measure of one’s 
self-confidence, it fits in well with the stereotype threat research as a possible mediator of the 
effects of disparaging statements on performance on a political knowledge test.  
 Young voters are commonly disparaged for their low levels of political knowledge in 
both the traditional press as well as in entertainment programming. This is a concern since 
some young voters feel that they do not know enough to participate in politics, possibly 
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inhibiting their motivation to be politically active. It is possible that the way young voters are 
discussed and represented in the media may cause feelings of inadequacy. While there are 
several studies about the effects of political humor about candidates on young voters’ 
attitudes, little research to date has examined the effects of disparaging messages about 
young voters on young voters. While some scholars argue that late-night political humor 
shows create cynical and ill-informed citizens, it is possible that people dismiss information 
from these shows as “just jokes,” or their attitudes towards the material is influenced by their 
affective expectations. This research examined the mediating role of humor expectancy on 
political attitudes and the mechanisms thought to increase stereotype threat effects. 
 The present experiments add to the literature by testing the effects of stereotype threat 
on young adults with regards to their levels of political knowledge. Stereotype threat is a 
phenomenon whereby people made cognizant of a negative stereotype about a group 
unintentionally confirm that stereotype in a subsequent task. Experiment 1 was run to 
document the phenomenon of stereotype threat in young voters with regard to their level of 
political knowledge. The research question for experiment 1 was as follows: 
 RQ1: For young people, what is the relationship between having one’s age made 
salient and the purported diagnosticity of the test on political information efficacy and 
performance on a political knowledge test? 
 Prior literature indicates that indicating affiliation with a stereotyped group (salience) 
can increase stereotype threat effects, as can performing a task described as indicative of 
one’s abilities (purported diagnosticity) (e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995). Based on the 
literature on stereotype threat, the following hypotheses were offered: 
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H1a: Making the age group of young voters salient prior to a political knowledge test will 
negatively affect political information efficacy and political knowledge scores. 
H1b: Anxiety and motivation will mediate the effects of age salience on political information 
efficacy and performance on the political knowledge test. 
The presence of the age salience manipulation will increase scores on the anxiety and 
motivation measures. Increases in these mediating variables will in turn result in decreases in 
political information efficacy and performance on the political knowledge test. The inclusion 
of anxiety and motivation in the regression models will reduce or eliminate the effects of the 
age salience manipulation on the dependent variables.  
H1c: Political information efficacy will mediate the effects of age salience on the 
political knowledge test. 
The presence of the age salience manipulation will cause a decrease in scores on the 
political information efficacy scale. This decrease will lead to subsequent decreases in 
performance on the political knowledge test. The inclusion of PIE in the regression model 
will reduce or eliminate the effects of the age salience manipulation on performance on the 
political knowledge test.  
H1d: Belief in the stereotype, awareness of the stereotype, and group and domain 
identification will moderate the influence of age salience on political information efficacy 
scores and political knowledge performance. 
People who report lower scores on any of the moderating variables will not be as 
affected by the presence of the age salience manipulation as people who report higher scores 
on those variables. 
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H2a: Describing the test as diagnostic will negatively affect political information efficacy 
and political knowledge scores.  
H2b: Anxiety and motivation will mediate the effects of the diagnostic salience manipulation 
on political information efficacy and performance on the political knowledge test. 
The presence of the diagnostic salience manipulation will increase scores on the 
anxiety and motivation measures. Increases in these mediating variables will in turn result in 
decreases in political information efficacy and performance on the political knowledge test. 
The inclusion of anxiety and motivation in the regression models will reduce or eliminate the 
effects of the diagnostic salience manipulation on the dependent variables.  
H2c: Political information efficacy will mediate the effects of diagnostic salience on the 
political knowledge test. 
The presence of the diagnostic salience manipulation will cause a decrease in scores 
on the political information efficacy scale. This decrease will lead to subsequent decreases in 
performance on the political knowledge test. The inclusion of PIE in the regression model 
will reduce or eliminate the effects of the diagnostic salience manipulation on performance 
on the political knowledge test.  
H2d: Belief in the stereotype, awareness of the stereotype, and group and domain 
identification will moderate the influence of diagnostic salience on political information 
efficacy scores and political knowledge performance. 
People who report lower scores on any of the moderating variables will not be as 
affected by the presence of the diagnostic salience manipulation as people who report higher 
scores on those variables. 
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H3: The presence of both the age salience and diagnostic salience manipulations together 
will affect attitudes and performance more than either independent variable in isolation.  
Experiment 2 
The goal of the second experiment was to test whether exposure to disparaging political 
humor or political statements influenced young citizens’ attitudes and performance in a 
similar manner as the first experiment and whether the expectation of humor influences these 
effects.   
For experiment 2, the following research question was asked: 
RQ2: For young voters, what is the relationship between exposure to disparaging political 
statements or political humor on political information efficacy and performance on a political 
knowledge test? 
 Prior theorizing indicates that exposure to political humor may have negative effects 
on individuals’ political attitudes (e.g., Hart & Hartelius, 2007). There is some evidence that 
exposure to political humor about politicians may cause feelings of cynicism (e.g., 
Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; 2008). Therefore, the following hypothesis was offered: 
H4: Exposure to humorous disparagement will have a greater negative effect on political 
information efficacy and performance on the political knowledge test than will exposure to 
non-humorous disparagement.  
 However, there is reason to think that concerns about the effects of political humor on 
young citizens are unwarranted, since people cued about the presence of humor (as are late-
night humor viewers) approach messages with different expectations (Katz & Pexman, 1997; 
McGhee, 1972; Pexman & Olineck, 2002; Zillmann, 1983). Therefore, the following 
hypothesis was offered: 
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H5: Participants in the humor expectancy conditions will indicate greater political 
information efficacy and perform better on the political knowledge test than will participants 
in the no expectation conditions.  
H6: Anxiety, motivation, and message counterarguing will mediate the effects of humor 
expectancy and exposure to disparaging political statements or humor on political 
information efficacy and performance on the political knowledge test. 
 Hypothesis 6 sought to identify the mechanisms through which expected or 
unexpected exposure to humor affects attitudes and performance on the political knowledge 
test. Participants exposed to humorous disparagement will indicate higher scores on the 
mediating variables than will participants exposed to non-humorous disparagement only 
when the humor is unexpected. This difference will account for the lower scores in the 
humorous disparagement conditions (Hypothesis 4). In other words, if humor is a negative 
force on individuals’ attitudes and behaviors, then people exposed to humorous 
disparagement will feel anxious, feel motivated, and engage in more counterarguing than 
people exposed to non-humorous disparagement, and thus perform worse on the political 
knowledge test. On the other hand, participants in the humor expectancy conditions will have 
lower scores on the mediating variables than will participants in the no expectation 
conditions. This difference will account for the greater efficacy and better performance on 
the political knowledge test in the expectancy conditions (Hypothesis 5). In other words, the 
cue that humor is forthcoming cues people that the information to follow is not to be taken 
seriously, thereby reducing anxiety, motivation, and counterarguing, and in s doing, eliminate 
or reduce stereotype threat effects.  
33 
H7: Political information efficacy will mediate the effects of humor expectancy and exposure 
to disparaging political statements or humor on performance on a political knowledge test.  
 Participants exposed to humorous disparagement will report lower political 
information efficacy than will participants in the non-humorous disparagement conditions, 
only when it is unexpected. This decrease in efficacy will account for the subsequent 
decrease in performance on the political knowledge test (Hypothesis 4). Participants in the 
humor expectancy conditions will report higher levels of efficacy than will participants in the 
no expectation conditions, and this difference will account for the improved performance on 
the political knowledge test (Hypothesis 5).  
H8: Belief in the stereotype, awareness of the stereotype, and group and domain 
identification will moderate the influence of the disparaging statements or humor on political 
information efficacy and political knowledge performance. 
 People who report lower scores on any of the moderating variables will not be as 
affected by exposure to disparaging political statements or political humor as will people 
who report higher scores on those variables. 
H9: An interaction effect between humor expectancy and exposure to disparaging political 
humor on political knowledge and political information efficacy is predicted. Regardless of 
whether participants are exposed to the disparaging humor or statement, participants in the 
humor expectancy conditions will perform equally as well on the political knowledge test 
and indicate equal levels of PIE. The effect of political humor will only be significant 
(resulting in a decrease in scores on both dependent measures) under the condition where it is 
unexpected.  
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1 METHOD 
 Two experiments were run to test the effects of disparaging political humor on young 
voters’ political attitudes and performance on a political knowledge test. Participants in both 
experiments were drawn from undergraduate classes at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill to take part in a “Media Diet” study. Subjects entered the lab, were greeted by 
the principal investigator, asked to sign in to receive course credit, handed an informed 
consent document with a random letter (A through D) written prominently on top, and 
directed to an available computer terminal. The sessions began a few minutes after their 
scheduled time, with groups as small as five and as a large as 25 participating at any time.  
 Experiment 1 asked, “what is the relationship between having one’s age made salient 
and the purported diagnosticity of the test on political information efficacy and performance 
on a political knowledge test?” This experiment used a between subjects factorial design, 
with age salience (present vs. absent) and diagnosticity (present vs. absent) as the 
independent variables in the 2x2 design. Four separate computers “surveys” were 
constructed, with the only differences being the independent variables of age and diagnostic 
salience. On the screen of each computer terminal was a Word document with A, B, C & D 
listed in blue letters. Participants were instructed to look at the top of their informed consent 
document to find out which of these four surveys they had been randomly assigned to take. 
Upon clicking the letter on their computer screen, all participants read the following 
 
35 
message: “Thank you for participating in this research. You have been assigned to a study 
about politics and political knowledge. To proceed, please click the forward arrow.” 
Participants in the age salience conditions (A & B) were then asked the following question: 
To begin, please select the age category to which you belong; (18-24) (Young voter), 25-39 
(Adult voter), 40-60 (Middle Age voter), or 61+ (Senior voter). In the age salience absent 
conditions (C & D), participants did not see this question. 
 Participants in the diagnostic conditions (A & C) then read the following message: 
“The political knowledge test you are about to take is a useful tool for comparing the 
intelligence of groups. At the end of this study, you will receive feedback about your 
performance. To begin the experiment, please click the forward arrow.” In the conditions 
without diagnostic salience (B & D), there was no mention of the tests’ diagnostic nature. A 
table indicating the cells is below.  
Experiment 1 Design 
 Age Salience  No Age Salience 
Diagnostic  (A) High Threat (C) Mod Threat 
No mention of Diagnostics (B) Mod Threat (D) Control 
 
 A pre-test of an earlier version of this experiment was conducted the summer before 
this experiment was run. Half of the subjects were randomly assigned to select their age and 
then read the following statement before taking a political knowledge test. 
“It is widely believed that people your age are less informed about politics 
than most people. It has been shown that people your age are less politically 
informed than prior generations. The media often cover stories about how 
young voters like you do very poorly on political knowledge tests.  
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We would like for you to take a test of your level of political knowledge. 
Your results will be compared with those of people of other age groups.” 
 
 Results of the pre-test indicated that participants exposed to this threat answered 
fewer questions correctly than those not exposed to the threat, although the difference was 
not statistically significant, F(1, 50) = 3.44,  p=.069. The present research built off the pre-
test by separating the test diagnosticity from the age salience factor and making changes to 
the political knowledge test. 
 The dependent measures for both experiments were political knowledge and political 
information efficacy. Smith (1989) argued that political knowledge indices and scales 
typically are structured in one of two ways.  First, researchers may count the total number or 
percentage of correct responses (forced choice) to get a measure of a respondents’ political 
knowledge. Secondly, they might enlist free recall or memory measures, such as asking 
respondents for the names of political candidates, who controls the House of Representatives, 
the differences between Republicans and Democrats, or the ability to recognize the meaning 
of terms such as “conservative” or “liberal.” This research counted as correct or incorrect a 
series of fill in the blank, recall questions based on rules developed a priori. Appendix A lists 
the 13 questions that were used in the political knowledge test along with the answers that 
were accepted as correct. Test anxiety effects are more likely to be found when the test is 
cognitively taxing (Baumeister, 1984), therefore having people recall from memory without 
the aid of multiple choice should increase the likelihood that the hypothesized effects occur. 
The questions used to assess political knowledge build off the work of Delli Carpini and 
Keeter (1993) and National Election Studies questionnaires.  
 After completing the political knowledge test, participants completed the political 
information efficacy scale (Appendix B). The political information efficacy scale (Kaid et al., 
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2007) consists of four, five-point Likert scale measures. These four items showed high levels 
of reliability (Cronbach’s Alpha of .87) and together accounted for up to ten percent of the 
variance in youth voting behavior in 2000 and 2002 (Kaid et al., 2007).  
 After completing the two dependent measures, participants answered questions about 
what mental processes occurred while they were taking the political knowledge test. The 
most common state anxiety measures are intended to be taken before the test of performance 
abilities or they lack the specificity needed to provide a real understanding of the process. 
The present research measured anxiety using two scales. The first was a five measure 
semantic differential scale created by Mattson (1960), and used in stereotype threat research 
by Stone et al. (1999). For instance, participants were asked to indicate on a seven-point scale 
how they felt during the test from uneasy to easy, and uncomfortable to comfortable. The 
scale was tested for reliability and the items summed to create an anxiety score.  
 The second scale of anxiety consisted of eight exploratory items created for this 
research. Participants were asked their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale with 
statements such as “While taking the test, I was worried about confirming the stereotype that 
young voters are uninformed about politics,” and, “When I didn’t know the answer to a 
question, I was able to stay calm” (reverse scored). This scale was also tested for reliability 
and a score created for each participant.  
 Motivation and effort have been measured by self report, by the time spent on each 
question, and by the number of questions attempted, with mixed results (e.g., Aronson et al., 
1999; Beilock, Rydell, & McConnell, 2007; Jamieson and Harkins, 2007; Osborne, 2007; 
Schmader & Johns, 2003). The present research used a five-item Likert type scale to assess 
how much effort participants put into completing the test. Among the questions in the scale 
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(Appendix C) were, “When I didn’t know the answer to a question, I tried harder on the next 
one,” and, “I felt the need to distance myself from the stereotype that young voters are 
uninformed about politics.”   
 The belief in stereotype scale consisted of three questions to assess how strongly 
people believed prior to taking the test that young people are typically uninformed about 
politics. The awareness of stereotype scale, created by Pinel (1999), is capable of assessing 
awareness of any stereotype about any demographic group. For instance, one of the 
statements participants are asked about reads, “Before taking the test, I believed the 
stereotype that blank tend to be blank.” In this case the phrases “young voters” and 
“uninformed about politics” makes the scale applicable to the present research.  Appendix E 
contains the scales for the moderating variables of belief in and awareness of the stereotype.  
 The next two moderators were the degree to which participants felt that the group or 
domain in question was an important part of their identity. To assess group identification, 
Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) scale of collective self-esteem was adapted. Participants were 
asked their level of agreement on a five-point Likert scale with questions such as,  “In 
general, being a young voter is an important part of my self-image.”  
 The domain identification scale was adapted from Spencer et al. (1999) and Aronson 
et al. (1999). Participants were asked to identify on a five item, five-point Likert scale their 
level of agreement with statements such as, “Knowledge of politics is important to me,” and 
“I like politics.” Next, participants answered questions designed to assess their overall level 
of efficacy, using a widely used and reliable scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995). Finally, 
participants in all conditions answered basic demographic questions about their age, gender 
and political affiliation (See Appendix E).  
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS 
Sample 
 One hundred and thirty subjects participated in experiment 1. Participants ranged in 
age from 18 to 23, with a mean age of 20.39. The sample was largely female (84.6%). 
Participants identified themselves as Caucasian (80.7%), of mixed race (8.5%), Black 
(3.8%), Asian (3.8%), and Hispanic (3%). Most participants identified themselves as 
Democrats (47%), followed by the Republicans (29%), Independent (14%), Libertarians 
(6%), Other (2%), and Socialists (2%). 
Scale Reliability 
The political knowledge scale showed moderate reliability, Cronbach’s alpha =.679. 
The PIE scale exhibited strong reliability (α=.837). The established anxiety scale (Mattson, 
1960, referred to as Anxiety1) was highly reliable (α=.905), while the measure created for 
this study (Anxiety2) was weaker but still strong (α=.773). The scale for motivation exhibited 
very low reliability (α=.420). Three items on that scale were highly correlated and served as 
the basis of a more reliable scale (α=.695). These were, “I felt the need to counter the 
stereotype that young voters are uninformed about politics,” “I tried to counter the stereotype 
that young voters are uninformed about politics,” and “When I didn’t know the answer to a 
question, I tried harder on the next one.” The three question index of participants’ belief in 
the stereotype was the least reliable (α=.640). The stereotype awareness scale was reliable 
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(α=.754), as was the measure of group identification (α=.731). The domain identification 
scale was reliable (α=.811), as was the index of overall efficacy (α=.822). 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations for each of the three experimental 
conditions and the control group on the dependent variables of political knowledge and PIE.  
Table 1 
    Means and Standard Deviations for each Condition on the Dependent Variables  
 Political knowledge (out of 15) PIE (out of 20) 
Age Salience (N=33) (10.82, 1.91) (13.03, 3.32) 
Diagnostic Salience  (N=32) (9.19, 3.11) (12.38, 3.36) 
Age+Diag (N=35) (10.86, 2.43) (13.49, 3.28) 
Control (N=30) (10.40, 2.01) (12.30, 3.37) 
Total (N=130) (10.33, 2.48) (12.82, 3.37) 
 
 Table 2 displays the means and standard deviations for each condition on the 
mediating variables.  
Table 2  
 
Means and Standard Deviations for each Condition on the Mediating Variables 
 
 Anxiety 1 (out of 35) Anxiety 2 (out of 40) Motivation (out of 15) 
Age Salience (N=33) (17.03, 7.57) (23.52, 3.89) (8.67, 2.34) 
Diagnostic Salience (N=32) (18.00, 6.90) (23.75, 5.06) (9.34, 1.62) 
Age+Diag (N=35) (17.09, 7.37) (24.40. 4.52) (10.00, 2.17) 
Control (N=30) (18.53, 6.16) (24.77, 5.11) (9.53, 1.94) 
Total (N=130) (17.63, 6.99) (24.1, 4.62) (9.39, 2.08) 
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 Table 3 displays the means and standard deviations for each condition on the 
moderating variables. 
Table 3 
 
     Means and Standard Deviations for each Condition on the Moderating Variables 
 Awareness (50) Belief (17) Domain (25) Group (20) Efficacy (40) 
Age Salience (N=33) (27.58, 5.20) (9.55, 2.55) (14.49, 3.67) (8.91, 3.21) (32.58, 3.48) 
Diagnostic Salience (N=32) (29.47, 4.44) (10.13, 2.89) (14.53, 3.93) (9.66, 2.96) (32.50, 3.45) 
Age+Diag (N=35) (28.71, 4.85) (10.51, 2.21) (15.23, 3.92) (9.11, 2.03) (33.17, 3.29) 
Control (N=30) (29.7, 6.02) (10.20, 2.65) 
 
(13.90, 3.21) (9.40, 2.74) (30.90, 2.58) 
Total (N=130) (28.84, 5.15) (10.10, 2.57) (14.56, 3.69) (9.26, 2.74) (32.33, 3.30) 
  
Hypothesis Testing 
 Hypothesis 1a stated that making age salient to participants would result in a decrease 
in political information efficacy and political knowledge scores. Hypothesis 1a was not 
supported. As Table 4 indicates, participants in the age salience condition scored slightly 
higher on the political knowledge test (M=10.82) and PIE measure (M=13.03) than 
participants in the control condition (M=10.40 for political knowledge and 12.30 for PIE). 
Results indicate that, contrary to Hypothesis 1a, the presence of age salience resulted in 
increases in scores on the PIE measure (β=.730, t=.842, p=.403), and political knowledge 
measure (β=.418, t=.846, p=.401) as compared to the control group, though neither increase 
was significant.2 
 While age salience alone did not have a significant direct effect on the dependent 
variables, it is possible that it could have influenced the mediators. Recently, scholars have 
                                                
2 In order to remain consistent throughout this paper, regressions were used whenever 
appropriate. The same results would be attained through ANOVA or ANCOVA.  
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argued that the absence of direct effects does not preclude mediation or “indirect effects” 
from occurring (Hayes, 2009). Hypothesis 1b posited that the anxiety and motivation scores 
would mediate the relationship between the presence of the age salience manipulation and 
scores on the dependent measures. Hypothesis 1b was not supported. The means in Table 2 
show that whereas participants in the age salience condition were predicted to have higher 
scores on the mediating variables, participants in the control group actually indicated higher 
scores on these measures. To test whether these differences were significant, the mediators of 
anxiety (two measures) and motivation were regressed on the age salience manipulation. The 
presence of age salience led to non-significant decreases on Anxiety1 (β=-1.50, t=-.859, 
p=.394), Anxiety2 (β=-1.25, t=1.1, p=.276), and motivation (β=-.867, t=-1.59, p=.117) as 
compared to the control group.  
 To determine if the presence of age salience interacted with the mediating variables in 
predicting PIE and political knowledge scores, several regression models were run. Since the 
two anxiety measures were highly correlated (r=.567, p<.01), only the established scale was 
used in the full regressions. The models in Tables 4 and 5 indicate that regardless of whether 
the analysis included any or all of the mediating variables, age salience did not have a 
significant impact on PIE scores or political knowledge scores as compared to the control 
group. Similarly, Hypothesis 1c, which predicted the PIE would mediate the effects of age 
salience on political knowledge scores, is not supported.  Figures 1 and 2 displays the lack of 
mediation predicted in Hypotheses 1b and 1c.  
 Results for Hypothesis 1a, 1b, and 1c indicate that the presence of age salience alone 
did not directly affect PIE, political knowledge scores or the proposed mediating variables. 
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Neither did the addition of the mediating variables to the models reduce or change the effect 
of the age salience manipulation on the dependent variables. 
Table 4 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for PIE Scores (N=63) 
 a b c d  e 
VARIABLES      
(Constant) 12.3*** 9.67*** 15.42** 14.96** 11.93*** 
Age_alone .730 .875 .478 .596 .686 
Motivation  .276   .426* 
Anx1Score   -.168**  -.199** 
Anx2Score    -.108 - 
R2=.19      
Note: Model a contains age only, b contains age and motivation, c contains age 
and anx1, d contains age and anx2, e contains age, motivation, and anx1. 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Figure 1:  Analysis of relationship between age salience, anxiety, motivation, and PIE scores 
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Table 5 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores (N=63) 
Note: Model a contains age only, b contains age and motivation, c contains age and 
anx1, d contains age and anx2, e contains age and PIE score, f contains age, motivation, 
anx1, and PIE score.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
 Next, Hypothesis 1d stated that the effect of age salience on PIE and political 
knowledge scores would be stronger as scores on the moderating variables increased. 
Hypothesis 1d was not supported. First, it was determined that the presence of the age 
salience manipulation alone did not cause a significant change in any of the moderators 
(stereotype belief or awareness, domain or group identification), except for overall efficacy 
(β=1.68, t=2.15, p=.035). Participants in the age salience condition indicated higher levels of 
overall efficacy than participants in the control condition. 
 The effect of age salience on political knowledge scores was no different for 
participants regardless of their scores on the domain identification scale (β=-.094, t=-.671, 
p=.505), group identification scale (β=-.192, t=-1.12, p=.266), stereotype awareness scale 
(β=.136, t=1.518, p=.134), or stereotype belief scale (β=-.208, t=-1.082, p=.284). 
 Subsequent analyses were performed to test the effects of these individual difference 
variables on the relationship between exposure to the age salience manipulation and PIE 
scores. The effect of age salience on PIE scores was no different for participants regardless of 
 a b c d  e f 
VARIABLES       
(Constant) 10.4*** 10.85*** 12.06*** 12.08*** 6.71*** 8.45*** 
Age salience .418 .377 .283 .333 .199 .069 
Motivation  -.047    -.101 
Anx1Score   -.089*   -.034 
Anx2Score    -.068   
PIE_Score     .300*** .288*** 
R2=.32       
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their scores on the domain identification scale (β=.042, t=.221, p=.826), group identification 
scale (β=.081, t=.299, p=.766), stereotype awareness scale (β=.118, t=.737, p=.464), or 
stereotype belief scale (β=.042, t=.127, p=.899). 
Figure 2:  Analysis of relationship between age salience, anxiety, motivation, and political 
knowledge scores 
 
β=.418, ns 
 
β=.069, ns 
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*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 Hypothesis 2a stated that making the diagnostic nature of the test salient would result 
in a decrease in both the PIE and political knowledge measures. Hypothesis 2a was partially 
supported. The means on the PIE measure were nearly identical (M=12.38 for the diagnostic 
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condition and 12.30 for the control condition). Participants in the diagnostic condition 
averaged 9.19 correct answers to the political knowledge test, as compared to 10.40 for 
participants in the control group. These differences were tested using linear regression. 
Results indicate that the presence of the diagnostic salience manipulation did not effect PIE 
scores  (β=.075, t=.085, p=.932), but did cause a marginally significant decrease in scores on 
the political knowledge test (β=-1.213, t=-1.81, p=.075, See Table 6) as compared to the 
control group.  
Table 6 
Summary of Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores (N=62) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 10.40 .481  21.63 .000 
Diagnostic 
Salience Alone 
-1.213 (0.669) -0.228 -1.81 0.075 
 
R2=0.052  
 
 While diagnostic salience alone did not have a significant direct effect on PIE scores, 
it had a marginal effect on the political knowledge scores. It is possible that either of these 
relationships was mediated by the effect of diagnostic salience on the mediating variables. 
Hypothesis 2b posited that the anxiety and motivation scores would mediate the relationship 
between the presence of the diagnostic salience manipulation and scores on the dependent 
measures. Hypothesis 2b was not supported. First, the means in Table 1 show that whereas 
participants in the diagnostic salience condition were predicted to have higher scores on the 
mediating variables, participants in the control group actually indicated higher scores on 
these measures. To test whether these differences were significant, the mediators of anxiety 
(two measures) and motivation were regressed on the diagnostic salience manipulation. The 
presence of diagnostic salience led to non-significant decreases on the established anxiety 
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measure (β=-5.33, t=-.310, p=.750), new anxiety measure (β=-1.017, t=-.787, p=.435) and 
the motivation score (β=-.190, t=-.418, p=.677) as compared to the control group.  
 The models in Table 7 indicate that regardless of whether the analysis included any or 
all of the mediating variables, diagnostic salience did not have a significant impact on PIE 
scores as compared to the control group. Figure 3 displays this lack of mediation graphically. 
Anxiety and motivation did not mediate the relationship between diagnostic salience and PIE 
scores.  
Table 7 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for PIE Scores (N=62) 
 a b c d  e 
VARIABLES      
(Constant) 12.3*** 9.097*** 15.19*** 14.53*** 11.35*** 
Diagnostic_alone .075 .139 -.008 -.017 .065 
Motivation  .336   .44 
Anxiety1Score   -.156*  -.175*** 
Anxiety2Score    -.090 - 
R2=.14      
Note: Model a contains diagnostic only, b contains diagnostic and motivation, c 
contains diagnostic and anx1, d contains diagnostic and anx2, e contains diagnostic, 
motivation, and anx1. 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
 
 Table 8 shows that when controlling for the anxiety measures or PIE scores, the 
coefficient for diagnostic salience became more negative and crossed the p<.05 threshold for 
significance. This is likely an instance of statistical suppression due to correlations between 
the mediators and the dependent variable of political knowledge. Therefore, Hypotheses 2b 
and 2c are not supported. Figure 4 displays the relationship between diagnostic salience, the 
mediating variables, and political knowledge scores. 
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Figure 3:  Analysis of relationship between diagnostic salience, anxiety, motivation, and PIE 
scores 
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 Results for Hypothesis 2a, 2b, and 2c indicate that the presence of diagnostic salience 
alone did not directly affect PIE or the proposed mediating variables. However, as compared 
to the control group, the presence of diagnostic salience did result in a marginally significant 
decrease in political knowledge scores. 
 Next, Hypothesis 2d stated that the effect of diagnostic salience on PIE and political 
knowledge scores would be stronger as scores on the moderating variables increased. 
Hypothesis 2d received partial support. As with age salience, the presence of diagnostic 
salience did not cause a significant change in any of the other mediators or moderators except 
for overall efficacy (β=1.6, t=2.06, p=.044). Participants told that the test was diagnostic 
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performed worse on the political knowledge test, particularly when controlling for anxiety 
and PIE scores, yet surprisingly reported significantly higher levels of overall efficacy than 
participants in the control group.  
Table 8 
    Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores (N=62) 
Note: Model a contains diagnostic only, b contains diagnostic and motivation, c contains 
diagnostic and anx1, d contains diagnostic and anx2, e contains diagnostic and PIE 
score, f contains diagnostic, motivation, anx1, and PIE score.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
 The effect of diagnostic salience on political knowledge scores was no different for 
participants regardless of their scores on the domain identification scale (β=.241, t=1.49, 
p=.140), group identification scale (β=-.278, t=-1.16, p=.253), stereotype awareness scale 
(β=-.086, t=-.658, p=.513), or stereotype belief scale (β=.158, t=.631, p=.530). The effect of 
diagnostic salience on PIE scores did not differ for participants with higher levels of domain 
identification (β=-.11, t=-.544, p=.589). Stronger identification with young voters resulted in 
a marginal change in the effect of diagnostic salience on PIE scores (β= -.599, t=-1.95, 
p=.057, See Table 9). Increased awareness of the stereotype did not affect the relationship 
between diagnostic salience and PIE scores (β=.111, t=.625, p=.535), but higher self-reported 
belief in the stereotype did have a marginal effect on the relationship (β=.612, t=1.92, 
p=.060, See Table 10 ).  
 a b c d  e f 
VARIABLES       
(Constant) 10.4*** 11.77*** 13.78*** 13.06*** 4.61*** 9.18*** 
Diagnostic_alone -1.213 -1.24 -1.31* -1.32* -1.25* -1.34** 
Motivation  -.144    -.227 
Anxiety1Score   -.182***   -.105 
Anxiety2Score    -.108***  - 
PIE_Score     .471*** .423*** 
R2=.51       
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Table 9 
Summary of Regression Analysis for PIE Scores (N=62) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 7.74 2.24  3.45 .000 
Diagnostic 
Salience Alone 
5.74 (3.05) .842 1.88 .065 
 
Group Score .485 (.229) .401 2.12 .039 
Diagnostic*Group -.599 (.308) -.926 -1.95 .057 
R2=0.076  
 
Table 10 
Summary of Regression Analysis for PIE Scores (N=62) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 16.87 2.51  6.71 .000 
Diagnostic 
Salience Alone 
-6.15 (3.35) -.903 -1.84 .072 
 
Belief Score -.448 (.239) -.359 -1.88 .066 
Diagnostic*Belief .612 (.319) .981 1.92 .060 
R2=0.066  
 
 Hypothesis 3 stated that the presence of both independent variables would result in 
the strongest decreases in the dependent variables. While a review of Table 1 clearly 
indicates that Hypothesis 3 is not supported (participants receiving both treatments averaged 
higher scores on both dependent measures than participants receiving only one of the two 
treatments), the data were reviewed to see if the two independent variables interacted with 
one another to influence PIE or political knowledge scores. Scores on the dependent 
measures were compared between participants receiving both treatments and those receiving 
only one or neither treatment.  
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Figure 4:  Analysis of relationship between diagnostic salience, anxiety, motivation, and 
political knowledge scores 
 
β=-1.213 
 
β=-1.34** 
 
 β=-5.33, ns      β=-.105 
  
                                                     
                                                            β=-1.017, ns 
 
 
       β=-.190, ns        β=-.227, ns   
    β=.426* 
 
        β=.075, ns     β=.423*** 
  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 First, scores on the PIE and political knowledge measures were compared between 
participants in the age salience only condition to the age/diagnostic condition. Adding 
diagnostic salience did not result in the predicted decrease in PIE scores (β=.455, t=.569, 
p=.571) or political knowledge scores (β=.039, t=.073, p=.942). Adding diagnostic salience 
to age salience did not result in an increase in the established anxiety scale (Mattson, 1960) 
(β=.055, t=.031, p=.976), or new anxiety scale (β=.885, t=.863, p=.391). However, the 
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addition of diagnostic salience did increase the motivation of the participants significantly, 
(β=1.33, t=2.44, p=.017; See Table 11).  
Table 11 
Summary of Regression Analysis for Motivation Measure (N=68) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 8.67 .392  22.09 .000 
Adding 
Diagnostic 
Salience to Age 
1.33 (.547) .287 2.44 .017 
 
R2=0.083  
 
 The increase in motivation caused by adding diagnostic salience did not translate into 
differences in scores on the PIE or political knowledge measures. The presence of the 
mediating variables in the model did not change the effect of adding diagnostic salience to 
participants in the age salient conditions (See Tables 12 and 13). 
 Next, this analysis compared the scores of participants in the diagnostic salience 
alone condition and the age/diagnostic condition. What was the impact of having had ones’ 
age made salient on the effect of diagnostic salience? Participants asked to select their age 
before being told that the test was diagnostic indicated slightly higher PIE scores than 
participants not first asked to select their age (β=1.11, t=1.37, p=.175) and performed 
significantly better on the political knowledge test (β=1.67, t=2.46, p=.016; See Table 14). 
 The negative effect of diagnostic salience was significantly stronger in the absence of 
the age salience manipulation. In other words, participants in the condition with both 
treatments performed significantly better on the political knowledge test than participants in 
the diagnostic treatment alone condition. Therefore, a closer examination of the scores on the 
mediating variables in these two groups was warranted.  
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Table 12 
 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for PIE Scores (N=68) 
 a b c d  e 
VARIABLES      
(Constant) 13.03*** 11.19*** 16.58*** 15.51*** 13.73*** 
Adding 
Diagnostic 
Salience to Age 
.455 .172 .467 .549 -.033 
Motivation  .213   .376 
Anxiety1Score   -.209***  -.233*** 
Anxiety2Score    -.106 - 
R2=.29      
Note: Model a contains age only, b contains age and motivation, c contains age and 
anx1, d contains age and anx2, e contains age, motivation, and anx1. 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Table 13 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores (N=68) 
 a b c d  e f 
VARIABLES       
(Constant) 10.82*** 11.83*** 13.33*** 14.25*** 5.59*** 8.710*** 
Adding 
Diagnostic 
Salience to Age 
.039 .194 .047 .168 -.144 .076 
Motivation  -.116    -.143 
Anxiety1Score   -.147***   -.067* 
Anxiety2Score    -.146*  - 
PIE_Score     .400*** .344*** 
R2=.44       
Note: Model a contains diagnostic only, b contains diagnostic and motivation, c contains 
diagnostic and anx1, d contains diagnostic and anx2, e contains diagnostic and PIE score, 
f contains diagnostic, motivation, anx1, and PIE score.  
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
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Table 14 
        Summary of Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores (N=67) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 9.19 .490  18.76 .000 
Adding Age 
Salience to 
Diagnostic 
1.67 (.678) .292 2.46 .016 
 
R2=0.085  
 
 Adding age salience to diagnostic salience did not result in the differences on the 
established anxiety scale (β=-.914, t=-.523, p=.603), new anxiety scale (β=.650, t=.555, 
p=.581), or motivation scale (β=.656, t=1.39, p=.168). The addition of the mediators to the 
model did not change the effect of adding age salience to participants in the diagnostic 
condition on PIE scores (Table 15) or reduce the effect on political knowledge scores (Table 
15). Therefore, while participants in the age salience/diagnostic salience condition performed 
significantly better on the political knowledge test than participants in the no age 
salience/diagnostic condition, this difference is unaccounted for by the mediating variables. 
Results indicate that there is an effect of having both manipulations as opposed to either in 
isolation. However, the data show that rather than working together to decrease performance 
or increase anxiety and motivation, the presence of age salience removed the negative effect 
of diagnostic salience on scores on the political knowledge test.   
 Next, an omnibus regression model with both independent variables and the 
mediating variables was run. As Table 17 indicates, participants in the diagnostic alone 
condition performed significantly worse on the political knowledge test even when the other 
factors were included in the model. 
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Table 15 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for PIE Scores (N=67) 
 a b c d  e 
VARIABLES      
(Constant) 12.38*** 10.17*** 16.04*** 14.46*** 12.96*** 
Adding Age 
Salience to 
Diagnostic 
1.11 .956 .924 1.17 .677 
Motivation  .235   -.357 
Anxiety1Score   -.204***  -.218*** 
Anxiety2Score    --.088 - 
R2=.40      
Note: Model a contains age only, b contains age and motivation, c contains age and 
anx1, d contains age and anx2, e contains age, motivation, and anx1. 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
 
Table 16 
            Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores (N=67) 
 a b c d  e f 
VARIABLES       
(Constant) 9.19*** 11.24*** 13.24*** 13.25*** 2.09* 7.79*** 
Adding Age 
Salience to 
Diagnostic 
1.67* 1.81* 1.46* 1.78** 1.03* 1.20** 
Motivation  -.220    -.270* 
Anxiety1Score   -.226***   -.116** 
Anxiety2Score    -.171*  - 
PIE_Score     .573*** .485*** 
R2=.63       
Note: Model a contains age only, b contains age and motivation, c contains age and    
anx1, d contains age and anx2, e contains age and PIE score, f contains age, motivation, 
anx1 and PIE score. 
*p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001 
    
Next, the data were analyzed to determine, using the measured variables, the best 
model to predict political knowledge scores. A four variable model proved to be the strongest 
and most parsimonious predictor of political knowledge scores. Just under half of the 
variance in political knowledge scores could be accounted for by including PIE scores, 
anxiety scores, motivation scores, and domain identification scores. Participants with higher 
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PIE and domain scores and lower anxiety and motivation scores performed better on the 
political knowledge test. Finally, a summary of hypotheses and findings for Experiment 1 is 
found in Table 19.  
    Table 17 
   Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores  (N=130) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 8.76 1.09  8.05 .000 
Age_alone -.135 (.462) -.024 -.292 .771 
Diagnostic_alone -1.32 (.458) -.230 -2.88 .005 
Age*Diagnostic -.037 (.453) -.007 -.081 .936 
PIE Score .387 (.053) .527 7.26 .000 
Anxiety1Score -.080 (.026) -.225 -3.09 .002 
Motivation -.173 (.083) -.145 -2.09 .038 
R2=0.497    
  
     Table 18 
   Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores  (N=130) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 7.48 1.10  6.80 .000 
PIE Score .299 (.068) .407 4.37 .000 
Anxiety1Score -.065 (.027) -.183 -2.41 .018 
Motivation -.218 (.085) -.183 -2.58 .011 
Domain Score .151 (.064) .225 2.34 .020 
R2=0.472    
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Table 19 
Summary of Hypotheses for Experiment 1 
 
+= supported, +?=limited support, - no support 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Table 
1 
Table 
4 
Table 
5 
Tables 
6, 17 
Table 
7 
No 
Table 
H1a Making the age group of young voters 
salient prior to a pk test will negatively 
affect PIE and pk scores  
-      
H1b Anxiety and motivation will mediate the 
effects of age salience on PIE and 
performance on the pk test. 
 - -    
H1c PIE will mediate the effects of age 
salience on the pk test  
  -    
H1d Belief in the stereotype, awareness of 
the stereotype, and group and domain 
identification will moderate the 
influence of age salience on PIE and pk 
scores. 
     - 
H2a Describing the test as diagnostic will 
negatively affect PIE and pk scores 
   + for 
pk 
  
H2b Anxiety and motivation will mediate the 
effects of the diagnostic salience 
manipulation on PIE and performance 
on the pk test. 
    -  
H2c PIE will mediate the effects of 
diagnostic salience on the pk test.  
    -  
H2d Belief in the stereotype, awareness of 
the stereotype, and group and domain 
identification will moderate the 
influence of diagnostic salience on PIE 
scores and pk performance. 
     - 
H3 The presence of both the age salience 
and diagnostic salience manipulations 
together will affect attitudes and 
performance more than either 
independent variable in isolation.  
-      
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT 1 DISCUSSION 
 Experiment 1 sought to determine if young voters’ attitudes or performance on a 
political knowledge test could be affected by stereotype threat, induced by making group 
membership and test diagnosticity salient. Results for experiment 1 indicate that for this 
sample of participants making age salient did not result in the predicted decrease in scores on 
the political knowledge or PIE measures. Nor did age salience result in an increase in any of 
the mediating variables. In fact, when participants in the diagnostic condition (who 
performed worse on the political knowledge test than the control group) were first asked their 
age, the effect of diagnostic salience disappeared. It appears that the tests’ purported power to 
reliably find differences between groups did affect performance, though not through the 
mediators explored in this study, and not in combination with increased age salience. It is 
likely that some other aspect of the participants’ identity (e.g., their race or gender) was 
threatened in the diagnostic condition, though this is merely speculation, as strength of 
identification with these groups was not measured. It does appear, however, that whereas 
making the test’s diagnostic nature salient after making age salient did not affect 
performance, the presence of age salience removed the negative effect of diagnostic salience.  
 There are at least two ways to interpret these results. First, for the participants 
involved, age salience may not have served as a symbol of personal weakness with regard to 
political knowledge. On the other hand, the strength of the age salience manipulation may 
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have been too weak to find the hypothesized effects. The second experiment sought to 
determine if exposing young voters to more explicit threatening information about their age 
group had different effects on their performance and attitudes.  
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CHAPTER V 
EXPERIMENT 2 METHOD 
 Experiment 2 asked, “what is the relationship between exposure to disparaging 
political statements or political humor on political information efficacy and performance on a 
political knowledge test?” This experiment used a 2x2 between subjects factorial design with 
1 control group. The manipulated independent variables were humor expectancy (Jon Stewart 
vs. Minneapolis Star Tribune3) and humorousness of content (humorous vs. non-humorous). 
Participants (N=150) were randomly assigned to one of four experimental groups or the 
control group.  
 As with experiment 1, subjects participated in this study using a computer in a lab. 
On the screen of each computer was a Microsoft Word document with the letters E, F, G, H 
or I in blue letters. Clicking on any of the letters directed the subject to one of the five 
conditions. Each of the participants was given an informed consent document upon entering 
the lab with a randomly assigned letter written prominently on top of the page.. Upon 
clicking the letter on their computer screen, all participants read the following message: 
“Thank you for participating in this research. You have been assigned to a study about 
politics and political knowledge. To proceed, please click the forward arrow.” 
                                                
3 The Minneapolis Star Tribune is a nationally recognizable name yet it does not have with it 
the “baggage” of being associated with a political philosophy or any memorable scandals  
(e.g. The New York Times).  
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 Participants assigned to the humor expectancy conditions read the following 
statement: “Before you begin the survey, please read this recent quote from Jon Stewart, host 
of The Daily Show on Comedy Central.” Participants in the no expectation of humor 
condition read, “Before you begin the survey, please read this recent quote from David 
Jennings, journalist for The Minneapolis Star Tribune.” The control group was not made to 
expect a quote nor read a quote prior to taking the political knowledge test. (See table below). 
Experiment 2 Design 
 Humorous Non-humorous 
Jon Stewart (Humor expectancy) Expect+Receive Expect+Don’t receive 
Minneapolis Star Tribune Don’t Expect+ Receive Don’t Expect+Don’t Receive 
 
 Participants then read either a humorous or non-humorous disparaging quote about 
young voters purportedly from the source. This experiment involved the creation of two 
“content equivalent” quotes disparaging young people for their stereotypically low levels of 
political knowledge and involvement. This procedure is widely used in humor and 
advertising research and is becoming more popular in political communication research as 
well (e.g., Nabi et al., 2007).  
The non-humorous version of the disparaging statement read as follows: 
“When it comes to politics, young people have no clue what’s going on, they’ve got no actual 
opinion, they’ve never affected the outcome, and they’d rather be sleeping.” 
The humorous version of the statement read: 
“When it comes to politics, young people are like Punxsutawney Phil on Groundhog’s Day. 
They have no clue what’s going on, they’ve got no actual opinion, they’ve never affected the 
outcome, and they’d rather be sleeping.” 
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 A pre-test was run on this quote with 40 undergraduate students. Participants were 
told they were reading a quote from Jon Stewart. Results indicate that participants found the 
humorous statement to be significantly more humorous (M=5.35/9) than the non-humorous 
statement (M=3.33/9), F(1, 39)=11.345, p=.002. This indicates that humor expectancy might 
have limited ability to influence perceptions of humorousness, although a comparison with a 
source other than Jon Stewart was not conducted. The post-test of the present experiment 
included manipulation checks of humor expectancy (Appendix G) and statement 
humorousness (Appendix F). 
 After reading the quote, participants read the following statement, “Next, we’d like to 
ask you some political knowledge questions.” Participants then took the political knowledge 
test, followed by the PIE scale as in Experiment 1.  
 In addition to the mediators from experiment 1, a new factor, statement 
counterarguing, was included in the analysis. Counterarguing of the message was assessed 
with a set of six items adapted from research by Nabi et al. (2007). Participants were asked to 
indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with statements such as, “I thought of 
reasons why what Jon Stewart/David Jennings said was wrong,” and “The statement popped 
into my head while I was taking the test.” (See Appendix D). Greater counterarguing was 
hypothesized to lead to inhibited performance. 
 As with the first experiment, participants then completed the measures of individual 
difference variables, were thanked for their participation and debriefed before leaving the lab. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS 
Sample 
 One hundred and fifty subjects participated in experiment 2. Participants ranged in 
age from 18 to 24, with a mean age of 20.62. The sample was largely female (79%). 
Participants identified themselves as Caucasian (84%), Black (5%), Hispanic (5%), Asian 
(4%), and of mixed race (2%). Most participants identified themselves as Democrats (42%), 
followed by the Republicans (31%), Independent (14%), Other (6%), Libertarians (5%), 
Green (1%) and Socialists (1%). 
Scale Reliability 
The political knowledge scale showed moderate reliability, Cronbach’s alpha =.652. 
The PIE scale exhibited strong reliability (α=.814). The established anxiety scale (Mattson, 
1960, Anx1) was highly reliable (α=.901), while the measure created for this study (Anx2) 
was weaker but still strong (α=.747). The scale for motivation exhibited very low reliability 
(α=.474). As with the first experiment, three items on that scale were highly correlated and 
served as the basis of a more reliable scale (α=.742). These were, “I felt the need to counter 
the stereotype that young voters are uninformed about politics,” “I tried to counter the 
stereotype that young voters are uninformed about politics,” and “When I didn’t know the 
answer to a question, I tried harder on the next one.” The counterarguing scale exhibited 
weak reliability (.393). A two-item measure was constructed using “I actively disagreed with 
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what Jon Stewart/David Jennings said,” and “I thought of reasons why what Jon 
Stewart/David Jennings said was wrong.” This scale exhibited a reliability of .729.  
Factor analyses were subsequently conducted to further determine whether the scales 
used for the mediating variables were uni-dimensional. As theorized, each of the mediating 
variables was found to load on a single factor with an eigenvalue greater than one. 
Furthermore, an omnibus factor analysis of all of the questions used to measure the 
mediating variables produced five distinct factors, corresponding well to the five proposed 
mediators (PIE, anxiety1, anxiety2, motivation, counterarguing).   
The belief in the stereotype scale was the least reliable (α=.533). The stereotype 
awareness scale was reliable (α=.728), as was the group identification scale, α=.824). The 
domain identification scale was reliable (α=.799), as was the established index of overall 
efficacy (α=.835).  
Manipulation Checks 
 To ensure that the manipulations of humor expectancy and stimulus humorousness 
did work, several analyses were run. First, towards the end of the experiment, participants 
were asked to recall the quote to the best of their ability. Three subjects were unable to recall 
the quote at all, and were eliminated from the subsequent analysis.  
Participants in the humorous/expected condition reported that the quote was 
somewhat funny (M=4.38/9). This is quite lower than it was in the initial pre-test (M=5.35). 
It is conceivable that this difference comes from the fact that while in the pre-test, 
participants were simply asked to read and rate the quote; in the present experiment, 
participants rated the quote after a long series of political knowledge and attitude questions. 
Perception of the quote’s humorousness may have been as high during the taking of the 
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political knowledge test, which immediately followed the manipulation, but trailed off as the 
experiment went on. Participants in the humorous/unexpected condition scored the quote as a 
little funny (M=3.59/9). In the non-humorous conditions, the quote was rated 3.27 when 
humor was expected and 2.50 when unexpected. In summary, participants in the humorous 
conditions rated the quote as significantly funnier (M=3.98) than participants in the non-
humorous conditions (M=2.88), (β=1.09, t=3.37, p=.001). Participants in the humor 
expectancy condition also rated the quote as funnier (M=3.81) than participants in the no 
expectation conditions (M=3.03), (β=.780, t=2.34, p=.021). However, there was not a 
significant interaction between the two independent variables and perceived humorousness.  
As another check, participants were asked how clever they considered the quote. The 
results mirror those of the humorousness check, with slightly higher means. The tables below 
show the effect of the two conditions combined on the perceptions of humorousness and 
cleverness. 
     Table 20 
   Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for How Funny (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 2.49 .275  9.08 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
1.09 (.319) .299 3.45 .001 
Humor Expected .780 (.319) .212 2.44 .016 
R2=0.134  
 
 There was no difference in how complicated or informative the quote was considered 
in the conditions. However, there was a marginally significant interaction between the two 
independent variables on perceptions of how confusing the quote was (See Table 22). 
Participants found the non-humorous quote from the MST more confusing than the humorous 
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quote from Jon Stewart. Also, the expectation of humor was associated with a significant 
decrease in the perceived negativity of the quote. Participants in the humor expectancy 
conditions considered the quote less negative than participants in the no expectation 
conditions (Table 23). 
     Table 21 
  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for How Clever (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 2.69 .296  9.11 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
1.23 (.344) .305 3.58 .001 
Humor Expected 1.10 (.344) .272 3.2 .002 
R2=0.167  
 
     Table 22 
   Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for How Confusing (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 1.67 .208  8.01 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
.333 (.297) .146 1.12 .264 
 
Humor Expected .133 (.294) .058 .45 .651 
Humorous*Expect -.789 (.419) -.297 -1.88 .063 
R2=0.427  
 
      Table 23 
   Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for How Negative (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 6.91 .297  23.23 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
-.335 (.345) -.085 -.97 .335 
 
Humor Expected -1.22 (.345) -.312 -3.53 .001 
R2=0.105  
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 Altogether, the humorous stimulus was rated as significantly funnier than the non-
humorous stimulus. The non-humorous quote in the MST condition was rated as more 
confusing than the quote in the humorous/expected condition. Participants expecting humor 
rated the quote as less negative than participants not expecting humor.  
 The next manipulation check focused on whether stating the source of the quote 
influenced participants’ mindsets before reading the quote. A humor expectancy scale with 
strong reliability (α=.783) was created using the following items: “I expected the quote to be 
funny,” “I expected to have to work through a joke,” “I was looking forward to reading the 
quote,” “I assumed I would enjoy the quote,” and “I expected the quote to be lighthearted.” 
Participants in the expectation conditions reported expecting humor significantly more than 
participants in the no expectation conditions, (β=3.89, t=8.06, p<.001; See Table 24).  
     Table 24 
   Summary of Regression Analysis for Humor Expectancy Score (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 12.88 .342  37.67 .000 
Jon Stewart 
(Humor Expected) 
3.89 (.484) .599 8.06 .000 
 
R2=0.359  
 
 There was a marginally significant negative interaction between humor and 
expectancy on the humor expectancy score (See Table 25). Participants in the humor 
expectancy condition that did not get humor reported expecting humor more than participants 
that did get humor. Participants in the no expectation condition that did not get humor 
reported expecting humor less than participants given humor.  
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     Table 25 
  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Humor Expectancy (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 12.3 .476  25.86 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
1.18 (.678) .182 1.74 .084 
 
Humor Expected 4.8 (.673) .738 7.14 .000 
Humorous*Expect -1.84 (.959) -.243 -1.91 .058 
R2=0.381  
 
 Altogether, participants told that Jon Stewart was the source of the forthcoming quote 
indicated significantly higher levels of humor expectancy. Participants reported expecting 
humor slightly more when it was expected but not received or unexpected and received.  
Descriptive Statistics 
 Tables 26, 27, and 28 display the means and standard deviations of the groups’ scores 
on each of the dependent, mediating, and moderating variables, respectively.  
Table 26 
Means and Standard Deviations on Dependent Variables for each Condition 
 PK  (out of 15) PIE (out of 20) 
Humor/Expect (N=29) 10.52, 1.88 12.86, 2.63 
Humor/No Expect (N=29) 9.62, 2.51 12.55, 3.69 
No Humor/No Expect (N=30) 10.53, 1.93 12.83, 2.89 
No Humor/Expect (N=30) 9.37, 2.34 12.77, 2.81 
Control (N=32) 10.53, 2.50 13.28, 3.28 
Total (N=150) 10.12, 2.28 12.87, 3.05 
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Table 27 
Means and Standard Deviations on Mediating Variables for each Condition 
 
 
Table 28 
 
Means and Standard Deviations on Moderating Variables for each Condition 
 Awareness 
(out of 50) 
Belief (out 
of 17) 
Domain (out 
of 25) 
Group (out 
of 20) 
Efficacy (out 
of 40) 
Humor/Expect 
(N=29) 
29.76, 5.20 10.07, 2.67 15.07, 3.24 9.48, 3.65 33.31, 3.52 
Humor/No Expect 
(N=29) 
30.07, 4.59 10.00, 2.41 14.59, 3.77 9.66, 3.29 32.52, 3.25 
No Humor/No 
Expect (N=30) 
29.97, 5.89 10.23, 2.25 14.80, 3.81 9.37, 2.95 31.90, 3.36 
No Humor/Expect 
(N=30) 
30.07, 5.02 10.07, 1.99 14.57, 3.99 9.37, 2.79 32.17, 4.19 
Control (N=32) 29.75, 5.09 10.47, 2.82 14.84, 3.72 9.69, 3.04 32.53, 3.42 
Total (N=150) 29.92, 5.11 10.17, 2.42 14.77, 3.67 9.51, 3.12 32.38, 3.54 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 Figures 5 and 6 display the means of the four experimental conditions on measures of 
political knowledge and PIE, respectively.  
 
 
 Anxiety 1 
(out of 35) 
Anxiety 2 
(out of 40) 
Motivation 
(out of 15) 
Counterarguing 
(out of 10) 
Humor/Expect (N=29) 19.48, 6.69 25.48, 4.52 10.17, 2.00 6.14, 2.13 
Humor/No Expect (N=29) 18.24, 6.27 25.10, 4.59 9.62, 2.87 6.79, 1.69 
No Humor/No Expect (N=30) 19.63, 5.97 25.60, 4.46 10.07, 2.39 6.73, 1.41 
No Humor/Expect (N=30) 17.57, 7.55 24.60, 5.00 10.00, 1.93 6.33, 1.85 
Control (N=32) 18.97, 6.93 23.16, 4.03 9.39, 2.08 - 
Total (N=150) 18.78, 6.66 24.76, 4.55 9.95, 2.31 6.50, 1.79 
70 
Figure 5: Graph of mean political knowledge scores by condition 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       
   Figure 6: Graph of mean PIE scores by condition 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 Hypothesis 4 stated that exposure to disparaging political humor would have a greater 
negative effect on political information efficacy and performance on the political knowledge 
test than exposure to non-humorous disparagement. Hypothesis 4 was not supported.  
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 To begin, scores were compared between participants exposed to either form of 
disparagement and the control group. First, political knowledge and PIE were compared 
between participants in the humorous disparagement conditions and the control group. 
Results indicate exposure to humorous disparagement resulted in a non-significant decrease 
in scores on the political knowledge test (β=-.462, t=-.897, p=.372) and PIE (β=-.574, t=-
.811, p=.420) as compared to the control group. Next, scores were compared between 
participants in the non-humorous conditions and the control group. Results indicate that 
exposure to non-humorous disparagement also resulted in a non-significant decrease in 
scores on the political knowledge test (β=-.581, t=-1.15, p=.254) and PIE (β=-.481, t=-.736, 
p=.464) as compared to the control group.  Participants in the humorous and non-humorous 
disparagement conditions all scored lower on the political knowledge and PIE measures than 
the control group, though these effects were not significant.  
 Next, scores were compared between participants in the humorous and the non-
humorous conditions. Results indicate that there was no statistically significant difference 
between the political knowledge scores of participants based on this variable alone (β=.119, 
t=.290, p=.772). Similarly, there was no significant difference in political information 
efficacy between participants exposed to humorous versus non-humorous disparagement (β=-
.093, t=-.168, p=.867).  
 Hypothesis 5 stated that participants in the humor expectancy conditions would 
indicate greater political information efficacy and perform better on the political knowledge 
test than participants in the no expectation conditions. Hypothesis 5 was not supported. First, 
scores were compared between participants made to expect humor and the control group. 
Results indicate humor expectancy resulted in a non-
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political knowledge test (β=-.599, t=-1.19, p=.239) and PIE (β=-.468, t=-.731, p=.467) as 
compared to the control group. 
 Next, scores were compared between participants told that “David Jennings” was the 
source of the forthcoming quote (no expectation) and the control group. Results indicate 
participants not expecting humor performed slightly worse on scores on the political 
knowledge test (β=-.447, t=-.866, p=.389) and PIE (β=-.586, t=-.814, p=.418) as compared to 
the control group, although these differences were not significant.  
 Participants in the humor expectation and no expectation conditions all scored lower 
on the political knowledge and PIE measures than the control group, though these effects 
were not significant. Next, scores were compared between participants made to expect humor 
and those not expecting humor. Results indicate that participants in the expectation of humor 
conditions performed virtually the same as participants not made to expect humor (β=-.153, 
t=-.372, p=.710) and indicated similar attitudes as well (β=.119, t=.214, p=.831). 
 To test whether the effects of humor expectancy or exposure to humorous or non-
humorous disparagement were mediated (Hypotheses 6 and 7) scores on the mediating 
variables were also compared between these groups. It was previously shown that the 
expectation of or exposure to disparaging humor or statements did not affect PIE, so 
Hypothesis 7 was rejected. Hypothesis 6 was also rejected. Results indicate that participants 
exposed to disparaging political humor scored no different on the first anxiety measure (β=-
.107, t=-.073, p=.942) or motivation measure (β=.022, t=.040, p=.968) than the control 
group, but did report significantly more anxiety using the second measure (See Table 29).   
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     Table 29 
  Summary of Regression Analysis for Anxiety2 Scores (N=90) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 23.16 .769  30.10 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
2.14 (.958) .231 2.23 .028 
 
R2=0.053  
 
 Similarly, participants exposed to non-humorous political disparagement scored no 
different on the first anxiety measure (β=-.369, t=-.245, p=.807) or motivation measure 
(β=.158, t=.325, p=.746), but did report significantly more anxiety using the second measure 
than the control group (See Table 30). 
     Table 30 
  Summary of Regression Analysis for Anxiety2 Scores (N=92) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 23.16 .795  29.12 .000 
Non-humorous 
Disparagement 
1.94 (.985) .204 1.97 .051 
 
R2=0.041  
 
 Participants in the humorous disparagement conditions did not report significantly 
different scores on the anxiety measures (Anx1, β=.262, t=.214, p=.831, Anx2, β=.193, 
t=.227, p=.821) motivation measure (β=-.137, t=-.321, p=.749) or counterarguing measure 
(β=-.068, t=-.205, p=.838) than participants in the non-humorous disparagement conditions.  
 Participants made to expect humor scored no different on the first anxiety measure 
(β=-.460, t=-.297, p=.767) or motivation measure (β=.210, t=.455, p=.650) than the control 
group, but did report a nearly significant increase in anxiety using the second measure (See 
Table 31). 
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     Table 31 
  Summary of Regression Analysis for Anxiety2 Scores (N=91) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 23.16 .798  29.03 .000 
Humor Expected 1.88 (.991) .197 1.89 .061 
R2=0.039  
 
 Results indicate that participants in the no expectation conditions scored no different 
on the first anxiety measure (β=-.020, t=-.014, p=.989) or motivation measure (β=-.028, t=-
.050, p=.961) than the control group, but did report a significant increase in anxiety using the 
second measure (See Table 32). 
     Table 32 
   Summary of Regression Analysis for Anxiety2 Scores (N=91) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 23.16 .767  30.21 .000 
No Expectation of 
Humor 
2.20 (.952) .238 2.31 .023 
 
R2=0.057  
 
 Participants in the humor expectancy conditions did not report significantly different 
scores on the anxiety measures (Anx1, β=-.441, t=.360, p=.719, Anx2, β=-.322, t=-.378, 
p=.706) motivation measure (β=.237, t=.557, p=.578) or counterarguing measure (β=-.525, 
t=-1.61, p=.111) than participants in the no expectation conditions.  
 Seeing as the independent variables all affected Anxiety2 scores, two sets of 
regression equations were run to test whether the effects of expecting or experiencing 
humorous or non-humorous disparagement were mediated by anxiety. Tables 33 and 34 
show that anxiety did not mediate or change the effects of exposure to disparaging humor 
versus disparaging political statements on political knowledge scores or PIE.  
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      Table 33 
   Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores  (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 12.25 1.14  10.73 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
.137 (.404) .031 .338 .736 
 
Anxiety2 -.092 (.044) -.190 -2.08 .040 
R2=0.037  
 
      Table 34 
   Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for PIE Scores  (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 13.30 1.57  8.47 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
-.089 (.556) -.015 -.160 .873 
 
Anxiety2 -.020 (.061) -.031 -.331 .741 
R2=0.001  
 
 Tables 35 and 36 indicate that the addition of anxiety did not affect the difference 
between participants in the expectation of humor conditions and no expectation conditions. 
Therefore, while anxiety was affected the independent variables, these effects did not 
influence political knowledge or PIE scores.  
  Hypothesis 8 predicted that the effect of humorous disparagement on political 
knowledge would be different for participants along dimensions of the moderator variables. 
Hypothesis 8 was not supported. Results indicate that no difference was found for 
participants exposed to humorous disparagement along levels of the measures of stereotype 
belief (β=.182, t=.941, p=.349), stereotype awareness (β=-.045, t=-.429, p=.669), group 
identification (β=-.214, t=-1.30, p=.197), domain identification (β=-.048, t=-.377, p=.707) or 
efficacy (β=.033, t=.214, p=.831). 
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 Table 35 
   Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores  (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 12.42 1.15  10.76 .000 
Humor Expected -.182 (.404) -.041 -.451 .653 
Anxiety2 -.092 (.044) -.191 -2.09 .039 
R2=0.036  
 
 Table 36 
        Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for PIE Scores  (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 13.19 1.58  8.31 .000 
Humor Expected .112 (.556) .019 .202 .840 
Anxiety2 -.020 (.061) -.031 -.327 .744 
R2=0.001  
 
 Similarly, the effect of non-humorous disparagement on political knowledge as 
compared to the control group was no different for participants along levels of the measures 
of stereotype belief (β=.238, t=1.18, p=.250), stereotype awareness (β=-.079, t=-.805, 
p=.423), group identification (β=-.052, t=-.302, p=.763), domain identification (β=-.081, t=-
.667, p=.507) or efficacy (β=-.146, t=-1.00, p=.320).  
 The effect of humorous disparagement on PIE was no different for participants along 
dimensions of stereotype belief (β=.101, t=.381, p=.704), stereotype awareness (β=.157, 
t=1.09, p=.227), group identification (β=-.273, t=-1.25, p=.213), or domain identification 
(β=-.099, t=-.618, p=.538). 
 The effect of non-humorous disparagement on PIE was no different for participants 
along dimensions of the stereotype belief measure (β=.341, t=1.29, p=.200), stereotype 
awareness measure (β=.155, t=1.21, p=.228), or group identification measure (β=-.153, t=-
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.731, p=.467), but was different depending on how strongly participants identified politics as 
an important domain (See Table 37). 
Table 37 
Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for PIE Scores  (N=92) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 4.39 1.90  2.31 .023 
Non-humorous 
disparagement 
4.36 (2.31) .701 1.89 .063 
Domain Score -.599 (.124) .762 4.81 .000 
Non-humor*Domain -.323 (.152) -.834 -2.13 .036 
R2=0.279    
 
 Hypothesis 9 predicted an interaction effect between humor expectancy and exposure 
to disparaging political humor on political knowledge and PIE scores. It was hypothesized 
that participants would score equally well on the political knowledge and PIE measures 
under conditions of humor expectancy, regardless of whether the stimulus was humorous or 
not. When unexpectedly exposed to humor, they were predicted to perform worse and 
indicate lower PIE scores than when unexpectedly exposed to non-humorous disparagement. 
Hypothesis 9 revealed an interesting interaction of the two independent variables on political 
knowledge scores, though the predicted interaction was only partly supported. 
 First, political knowledge was regressed on both independent variables and no effect 
was found for either variable alone, controlling for the other (See Tables 38 and 39). 
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     Table 38 
  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores  (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 10.02 .354  28.30 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
.119 (.411) .027 .289 .773 
 
Humor Expected -.153 (.411) -.035 -.371 .711 
R2=0.002  
 
    Table 39 
  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for PIE Scores  (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 12.74 .479  26.6 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
-.093 (.556) -.016 -.167 .867 
 
Humor Expected .119 (.556) .020 .213 .831 
R2=0.001  
 
 Next, the dependent variables were regressed on the independent variables and the 
interaction term. Table 40 shows that the two independent variables did not have a significant 
interaction effect on PIE scores. 
 However, a significant interaction was found between the two independent variables 
and political knowledge scores (See Table 41).  As Table 41 indicates, at each level of the 
humor expectation variable, political knowledge scores decreased for people that got humor 
as compared to people who did not get humor, though this difference was not significant (β=-
.913, t=-1.61, p=.111). Interestingly, the inclusion of the interaction term reveals that 
regardless of whether the participants received humorous or non-humorous disparagement, 
scores were significantly lower for people made to expect humor as compared to people not 
made to expect humor (β=-1.17, t=-2.07, p=.041).  
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     Table 40 
  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for PIE Scores  (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 12.83 .554  23.181 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
-.282 (.790) -.047 -.357 .722 
 
Humor Expected -.067 (.783) -.011 -.085 .932 
Humorous*Expect .377 (1.12) .054 .338 .736 
R2=0.002  
 
     Table 41 
  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores  (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 10.53 .398  26.5 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
-.913 (.568) -.207 -1.61 .111 
 
Humor Expected -1.17 (.563) -.264 -2.07 .041 
Humorous*Expect 2.06 (.803) .402 2.57 .012 
R2=0.057  
 
 Whereas by themselves the expectation and presence of humor, controlling for the 
other, resulted in significant and nearly significant decreases in political knowledge 
respectively, the combination of both humor expectancy and a humorous stimulus negated 
these decreases. In other words, although participants who expected humor performed 
significantly worse than participants not expecting humor, and participants exposed to 
humorous disparagement performed slightly worse than participants exposed to non-
humorous disparagement, participants who both expected and received humor performed as 
well as participants not expecting humor and exposed to non-humorous disparagement, and 
better than those participants who either expected and did not receive humor or did not 
expect and did receive humor. The data indicate that the interaction counteracts the negative 
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effects of expecting or receiving humor. Thus, these apparent negative effects are only 
proxies for either (a) not receiving humor when it was expected, or (b) receiving humor when 
it was not expected.  
 Next, a full model regression was run to see if the interaction term was affected by 
any of the mediating variables. As Table 42 indicates, the strength of this interaction was 
unaffected by the inclusion of the mediators in the model.  
     Table 42 
   Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores  (N=118) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 8.78 1.39  6.33 .000 
Humorous 
Disparagement 
-.854 (.496) -.193 -1.72 .088 
 
Humor Expected -1.26 (.494) -.285 -2.55 .012 
Humorous*Expect 2.05 (.703) .399 2.91 .004 
PIE .341 (.062) .460 5.52 .000 
Motivation .020 (.095) .020 .208 .836 
Anx2 -.099 (.047) -.205 -2.11 .037 
Counterargue -.043 (.102) -.035 -.420 .675 
R2=0.057  
 
 So, how can one explain why participants unexpectedly exposed to humorous 
disparagement performed slightly worse on a political knowledge test than participants 
unexpectedly exposed to non-humorous disparagement? Participants in the no 
expectation/non-humorous condition indicated they were more relaxed (M=4.03) than 
participants in the no expectation/humorous condition (M=3.34), a nearly significant 
difference (β=.689, t=1.83, p=.073).  Scores on one of the questions used to assess stereotype 
awareness were also different between these two groups. Participants in the humorous/no 
expectation condition reported significantly stronger disagreement with the statement 
“Stereotypes about young voters have not affected me personally” than participants in the 
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non-humorous/no expectation condition (β=.461, t=1.87, p=.067). However feeling relaxed 
and that one has been personally affected did not reduce the effect of unexpected exposure to 
humor (See Table 43).  
      Table 43 
  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores  (N=59) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 11.55 1.53  7.53 .000 
Humor when 
Unexpected  
-1.10 (.615) -.245 1.79 .079 
Relaxed -.334 (.204) -.218 -1.64 .108 
Affected Personally .091 (.312) .039 .291 .772 
R2=0.090  
   
 How can one explain the difference in scores between people expecting and receiving 
humor and expecting and not receiving humor? As compared to participants who expected 
and did not receive humor, participants who expected and received humor indicated that they 
more strongly agreed that they were relaxed, (β=.768, t=1.70, p=.094), that they “put a lot of 
effort into answering the questions on the test,” (β=.321, t=1.62, p=.112), and more strongly 
disagreed that “when I didn’t know the answer to a question, I didn’t care,” (β=-.424, t=-
1.59, p=.118). The inclusion of these variables did not reduce the effect of exposure to non-
humorous disparagement when humor was expected (See Table 44). 
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     Table 44 
  Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores  (N=59) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 13.48 1.75  7.69 .000 
Non-Humorous when 
Humor Expected  
-1.45 (.568) -.335 -2.56 .013 
Relaxed -.441 (.162) -.354 -2.71 .009 
Didn’t Care -.223 (.272) -.106 -.820 .416 
Put in Effort -.187 (.358) -.066 -.523 .603 
R2=0.183  
   
 Next, the data were analyzed to determine, using the measured variables, the best 
model to predict political knowledge scores. A four variable model proved to be the strongest 
and most parsimonious predictor of political knowledge scores. Table 45 indicates that 
whereas experiment 1 found that a combination of PIE, anxiety, motivation and domain 
scores most fully predicted political knowledge performance, the best model for experiment 
2 included group score instead of motivation. Lastly, Table 46 displays the hypotheses and 
findings for Experiment 2 in summary form.   
Table 45 
    Summary of Multiple Regression Analysis for Political Knowledge Scores  (N=150) 
      
VARIABLES B SE(β) β t Sig.(p) 
(Constant) 6.09 1.03  5.89 .000 
PIE Score .265 (.060) .355 4.40 .000 
Anxiety1Score -.062 (.024) -.182 -2.54 .012 
Group Score -.095 (.053) -.130 -1.79 .075 
Domain Score .182 (.050) .293 3.66 .000 
R2=0.383    
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Table 46 
Summary of Hypotheses for Experiment 2 
 
+= supported, +?=limited support, - no support 
 
 
 
 
Hypothesis Tables 
33-36 
Table 
37 
Table 
41 
No 
Table 
H4 
 
Exposure to humorous disparagement will have a 
greater negative effect on PIE and performance on 
the political knowledge test than will exposure to 
non-humorous disparagement.  
 
   - 
H5 Participants in the humor expectancy conditions 
will indicate greater PIE and perform better on the 
political knowledge test than will participants in the 
no expectation conditions.  
 
   - 
H6 Anxiety, motivation, and message counterarguing 
will mediate the effects of humor expectancy and 
exposure to disparaging political statements or 
humor on PIE and performance on the political 
knowledge test. 
-    
H7 PIE will mediate the effects of humor expectancy 
and exposure to disparaging political statements or 
humor on performance on a political knowledge 
test. 
   - 
H8 Belief in the stereotype, awareness of the 
stereotype, and group and domain identification will 
moderate the influence of the disparaging 
statements or humor on PIE and political knowledge 
performance. 
 
 +? for 
domain 
and pk 
  
H9 An interaction effect between humor expectancy 
and exposure to disparaging political humor on pk 
and PIE is predicted. Regardless of whether 
participants are exposed to the disparaging humor or 
statement, participants in the humor expectancy 
conditions will perform equally as well on the pk 
test and indicate equal levels of PIE. The effect of 
political humor will only be significant (resulting in 
a decrease in scores on both dependent measures) 
under the condition where it is unexpected.   
 
  
 
 
+?  
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CHAPTER VII 
DISCUSSION 
 Every night, millions of young citizens tune in to late-night television shows, where 
they watch and potentially learn as they laugh at the foibles of the press, politicians, and the 
public. In academic and journalistic circles, this trend towards infotainment as information 
source has scholars questioning the role of humor in a democracy (e.g., Hart & Hartelius, 
2007). This research sought to determine whether exposure to disparaging political humor 
about their age group affected young voters’ attitudes and performance on a political 
knowledge test.  
 Experiment 1 failed to support the hypothesis that young voters would feel less 
politically efficacious or perform worse as a result of exposure to a manipulation that made 
their membership in a stereotypically less knowledgeable demographic salient. While 
participants did perform significantly worse when the test was described as diagnostic, this 
effect was eliminated when age was made salient. It was reasoned that either being a young 
voter was not seen by the participants as a sign of weakness or that the manipulation of 
stereotype threat was not strong enough to find the anticipated effects. In both experiments, 
participants tended to neither agree nor disagree with the statements on the awareness, belief, 
domain, and group identification scales, and the effect of age and diagnostic salience or 
either form of disparagement was rarely found to differ along levels of these measures. 
Therefore, at least for the participants in this sample, being a young voter was not a strong or 
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negative part of their identity. However, since there were significant effects of disparagement 
in experiment 2 under certain conditions, it seems that the age salience manipulation was too 
weak to bring about the anticipated effects.  
 Something akin to stereotype threat effects did occur in experiment 2. Participants’ 
performance on the political knowledge test assimilated towards the stereotype when humor 
was unexpectedly received or expected and not received. Humor therefore had two effects. 
Humor when expected aided in the dismissal of disparaging messages. Humor when 
unexpected aided in the fulfillment of the threat behind the disparaging message. Another 
way of looking at these results is that non-humorous disparagement had no effect on political 
knowledge scores when humor was unexpected, but did when humor was expected. 
Therefore, the absence of humor when expected also led to stereotype threat effects.  
 What caused participants to perform worse when unexpectedly exposed to humor 
may be different than what caused other participants to perform worse when not receiving the 
humor they expected. Participants not expecting humor were able to dismiss the threat in the 
non-humorous condition, but performed worse in the humorous condition, even though they 
rated the joke as more humorous. Humor here had a significant negative effect on 
performance, but not on attitudes. The data do not offer a clear answer for why performance 
was inhibited. Controlling for anxiety, motivation and counterarguing, or political 
information efficacy did not reduce the effects found in the interaction. More research is 
necessary to determine what factors contributed to the declines in performance.  
 Similarly, more research is needed to determine why people performed worse in the 
humor expectancy condition when humor was absent. The literature on affective expectations 
led to the prediction that all statements from Jon Stewart would be interpreted the same way. 
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Although statements from Jon Stewart were found to be more humorous than the statements 
coming from the journalist, participants who expected and did not receive humor rated the 
joke as less humorous than participants who expected and did receive humor, and performed 
worse on the political knowledge test. What the results indicate is that the absence of humor 
was noticed on some level in the humor expectancy/non-humorous condition. The 
expectation of humor (or a humorous mindset) was not enough to alleviate stereotype threat 
effects. The presence of humor was needed to resolve whatever unaccounted for feelings or 
thoughts were stirred up by the disparagement. Although affective expectations did influence 
explicit ratings of humorousness to some degree, expectations, at least of humor, were not 
found to be foolproof predictors of the way information affects behavior.  
 Although experiment 1 found that age salience did not create stereotype threat effects, 
even without an expressed allegiance or sense of connection with young voters, the more 
explicit disparagement in experiment 2 did cause stereotype threat effects under certain 
conditions.  This provides further evidence that stereotype threat effects may be induced in 
people with little to no feelings of affiliation towards the stereotyped group or domain, or 
little belief in or awareness of the stereotype. 
 Another possibility exists to explain the results of experiment 2. It may be that the 
cause of the decrease in performance was due not to the presence or absence of humor but 
merely the violation of expectations. Prior research indicates that experiencing a violation of 
expectations can have dramatic effects on both physiological measures and task performance 
(e.g., Mendes, Hunter, Jost, Blascovich, & Lickel, 2007). Perhaps any violation of 
expectation, humorous or non-humorous, would have caused such a decrease. One way to 
test this in additional experiments could be to include conditions in which participants read 
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unexpected nonsensical or gibberish quotes about young voters or other subjects from either 
David Jennings or Jon Stewart. It could then be determined if a violation of expectations is 
sufficient for performance inhibition or whether humor is the key ingredient.  
 Limitations and Future Research 
 There are several limitations to these experiments. First, people are not typically 
exposed to disparaging humor in a laboratory setting, nor do they take political knowledge 
tests (or any measure of performance) immediately after being exposed to disparagement. 
Second, people typically watch, rather than read statements from Jon Stewart. It is likely that 
different types of information processing occur when watching political humor as opposed to 
reading it. Additionally, the statements are not identical, as the non-humorous one contains 
37 words and the humorous one 28.  
 One weakness of the designs of these experiments is that all of the potential mediators 
and moderators were completed after responses were given to the two main dependent 
variables of interest, political knowledge and political information efficacy. The political 
information efficacy measure was also in the position of coming after the main dependent 
variable, but serving as both a mediator of that variable and a dependent variable all its own. 
Another version of these experiments could isolate one mediator and have half of the 
participants answer those questions immediately before completing the dependent measures. 
The problem with doing so is that answering questions about anxiety for instance prior to 
taking the political knowledge test would seem to prime the participants about the purpose of 
the study. Additionally, the use of self-report in assessing the mediators of interest may be 
unreliable (Wilson & Nisbett, 1978). It would be interesting to include more physiological 
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measures of anxiety (e.g., blood pressure, skin conductance) and humor enjoyment or 
appreciation (e.g., smiling).  
 Another limitation that offers areas for future research is the homogeneity of the 
sample. In both experiments, participants were mostly white females, and all participants 
were college students at a highly competitive public university. The present research does not 
make the case that all young citizens would react the same to humorous or non-humorous 
disparagement, and thus leaves open the possibility for exploration of effects in other groups 
of young people. It is important to test these effects with groups that might be less likely to 
vote in the first place, including young citizens not enrolled in college. Along those same 
lines, future research should include post-test measures of how strongly participants identify 
with any number of social categories to which they might belong (e.g., race, gender, class). 
In experiment 1, it is unclear why participants in the diagnostic condition performed worse 
on the political knowledge test, yet this effect was removed when age salience was added. It 
was theorized that the general statement about test diagnosticity triggered gender-related 
stereotype threat in the largely female sample, as was found through more explicit means in 
prior research (McGlone et al., 2006). With proper measurement, this could be verified.  
 These studies mark the beginning of a line of research into the ways that young voters 
are affected by portrayals of their age group in the media. Experiment 2 lends strong support 
to the idea that stereotype threat research can be used as a foundation for this research. 
Before running experiment 2, additional disparaging jokes were considered for inclusion. 
The rationale was that significant effects would not be expected from exposure to one joke. 
Similarly, critics of humor might have argued that one joke was not enough show the 
deleterious effects that humor can have. However, it was reasoned that stereotype threat 
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literature is full of examples wherein scholars found support for the theory simply by asking 
people to select their age or gender from a drop-down box, or by flashing words associated 
with a stereotyped group at a subliminal level. Therefore, if effects were not found based on 
one instance of disparagement, it would not mean that disparaging humor does not have 
negative effects in the short or certainly long term, but that more research would be needed. 
Similarly, if effects of exposure to one joke were found to have a significant effect on young 
citizens’ attitudes or performance on a political knowledge test, it could be argued that they 
may not reveal the extent of the effect of continued exposure.  
 Having found an interesting interaction between the expectation of humor, exposure 
to disparaging humor and performance on a political knowledge test, this research area can 
expand to include more and different types of humor. It would be interesting to compare the 
effects of the moderately humorous comments used as the stimulus for experiment 2 with 
more humorous stimuli. Do the effects of unexpected exposure to disparaging humor 
increase as the stimuli become more humorous? Are people more likely to dismiss 
disparagement from a humorous source as it gets more humorous? Additionally, future 
research should include post-test measures of attitudes towards the source (e.g. source liking, 
credibility). 
 Finally, it would also be fitting to combine the two experiments and test the effects of 
exposure to disparagement in the high threat (age salience/diagnostic salience) condition as 
compared to the low threat (neither age nor diagnostic salience) condition.  
Conclusion 
 Although the candidate for whom the majority of young voters cast their ballots in 
2008 was elected, the stereotype of an ill-informed youth did not end. A report (Ladner, 
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2009) issued by the Oklahoma Council of Public Affairs, a conservative think tank, and 
picked up by online sources such as Digg.com and Dailykos.com, detailed striking gaps in 
political knowledge amongst high school students in the state of Oklahoma. The survey 
found that less than three percent of those surveyed were able to correctly answer at least six 
out of ten questions from a United States citizenship exam. Notably, fourteen percent of 
respondents were able to name the author of the Declaration of Independence, and 23% 
correctly named the first George Washington as the first president of the United States.  
 Similarly, the election of Barack Obama did not mark the end of the stereotypical 
portrayal of an uninformed and unengaged youth in political satire. In the May 12th, 2009 
episode of The Daily Show, Jason Jones traveled to Arizona State University after school 
officials refused to grant President Obama an honorary degree when he acted as 
commencement speaker. Three male students defended their university on camera. One 
student says honorary degrees should be reserved for important people and “heads of state.” 
When asked if they believe that Ben Franklin was a worthy enough president to receive an 
ASU honorary degree, two out of the three students say yes, not knowing he never held the 
office. When the third student catches their mistake, Jones congratulates him, then asks him 
about Alexander Hamilton. The student mistakenly agrees that Hamilton would have been a 
worthy enough president to receive an honorary degree at ASU. 
 This research found that concerns about the effects of humor on late-night shows on 
young citizens may not be warranted, since as long as the programs’ content is humorous, the 
expectation of humor that comes with attention to the program aids in the dismissal of 
information as “just joking.” However, Jon Stewart and other late-night hosts often make 
impassioned, non-humorous pleas during their programs. Audiences may notice that these 
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statements are non-humorous, and as a result interpret them differently. Non-humorous 
statements from humorous sources may be more persuasive or influential than they would be 
if they were humorous. Similarly, news broadcasts frequently include humorous material as a 
way to increase their audience size and seem more relatable. When young citizens’ read the 
latest poll or news story about their age group’s lack of political knowledge, they may not be 
susceptible to stereotype threat effects. However, if a journalist uses clever language or 
imagery, these news stories may impact future political performance. It is here, in the blurred 
line between news and entertainment, where concerns about humor may be appropriate. It is 
unclear when or how people make the decision that a certain program is to be attended to in a 
serious or non-serious manner, or whether they do so at all. Assuming that people approach 
their news and entertainment programming with certain expectations of what the tone of the 
content will be, this research found that the violation of those expectations can have dramatic 
effects.  
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Appendix A 
Political knowledge test 
What is the name of the U.S. Senate majority leader? _________________  
  (Harry Reid, Reid) 
 
What specific position is held by John Roberts?  _________________________ 
   (Chief Justice, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Justice) 
  
Please list the three branches of government.  
  ___________________  
  ___________________ 
  ___________________   
      (legislative, judicial, executive) 
 
How much of a majority is required for the U.S. Senate and House to override a presidential veto?  _______ 
  (2/3) (66%) (67%) 
 
Whose responsibility is it to determine if a law is constitutional or not?  _______________________ 
   (The Supreme Court) 
 
Which political party has the most members in the House of Representatives in Washington? ___________ 
   (Democrat, Democrats, Democratic) 
 
What is the term commonly used to refer to the first ten amendments of the U.S. Constitution?  __________ 
   (Bill of Rights) 
 
How many years is the term of office for a U.S. Senator? _______ 
   (Six, 6) 
  
Which political party has the most members in the U.S. Senate? ________________ 
   (Democrat, Democrats, Democratic) 
 
What state do you consider to be your home state? _________________(not counted as right/wrong) 
  
  Please name one U.S. Senator from your home state. _____________________ 
   (Will be verified individually) 
 
  What political party does this Senator belong to? ____________________ 
   (Will be verified individually) 
 
What is the name of the current Secretary of State? _______________________ 
   (Hillary Clinton, Clinton) 
 
Which of the following issues is most important to you? 
 
  ______Abortion/Reproductive Rights 
  ______Education 
  ______Environment 
  ______Gun Control 
  ______Taxes 
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For the issue selected as important, the person answered a question about which party traditionally held a 
certain viewpoint. If they selected Abortion, they were asked, “Which party traditionally supports a woman’s 
right to choose to have an abortion?” (Democratic) For education, “Which party traditionally supports the 
privatization of education?” (Republican) For those who choose environment, they were asked, “Which party 
traditionally supports tougher government regulations on emissions?” (Democratic) For gun control, “Which 
party traditionally supports stricter gun laws?” (Democratic) For taxes, “Which party traditionally supports 
lower taxes? (Republican) 
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Appendix B 
Political information efficacy scale (From Kaid, McKinney, & Tedesco, 2007) 
 
I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics. 
 
     1    2    3    4    5   
  Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people. 
 
  1    2    3    4    5   
  Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country. 
 
  1    2    3    4    5   
  Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
If a friend asked me about the election, I feel I would have enough information to help my friend figure out who to vote 
for. 
  1    2    3    4    5   
  Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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Appendix C 
 Mediators for Experiments 1 and 2 
Anxiety/Threat (From Mattson (1960), used in Stone et al. (1999)) 
Please indicate how you felt while taking the test 
       1       2       3       4       5       6       7   (Reversed) 
Uneasy    At ease 
 
       1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Comfortable   Uncomfortable 
 
       1       2       3       4       5       6       7  (Reversed) 
Upset    Peaceful 
 
       1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
Relaxed    Tense 
 
       1       2       3       4       5       6       7 
In Control   Not in Control 
 
Please answer the following questions about how you felt while taking the political knowledge test. 
I was worried about confirming the stereotype that young voters are uninformed about politics. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
  
I was worried about how my performance would represent other young people. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I was worried about performing up to my abilities. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
When I didn’t know the answer to a question, I felt like I was confirming the stereotype that young voters are 
uninformed about politics. 
 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
When I didn’t know the answer to a question, I was able to stay calm. (reverse scored) 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
When I didn’t know the answer to a question, I was able to focus. (reverse scored) 
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   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I thought the test got harder as it went along. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
When I didn’t know the answer to a question, I didn’t care. (reverse scored) 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
Motivation/Effort 
Please answer the following questions about how you felt while taking the political knowledge test. 
I felt the need to distance myself from the stereotype that young voters are uninformed about politics. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I tried to distance myself from the stereotype that young voters are uninformed about politics. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I wanted to finish the test as quickly as possible. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
When I didn’t know the answer to a question, I tried harder on the next one. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I put a lot of effort into answering the questions on the test. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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Appendix D 
Mediator for Experiment 2 
Statement counterarguing (adapted from Nabi et al. (2007)) 
I actively disagreed with what Jon Stewart/David Jennings said. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I thought of reasons why what Jon Stewart/David Jennings said was wrong 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I dismissed what Jon Stewart/David Jennings said as just a joke (reverse scored) 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
Jon Stewart/David Jennings was serious about what he/they said  
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
Jon Stewart/David Jennings was trying to entertain more than persuade (reverse scored) 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
The statement popped into my head while I was taking the test. 
  1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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Appendix E 
Moderators for Experiments 1 and 2 
Belief in Stereotype 
Before taking the test, I believed the stereotype that young voters tend to be uninformed about politics. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
As a group, young voters are less informed about politics than the average citizen. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
What percentage of young voters is poorly informed about politics? 
  20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 
 
Awareness of Stereotype (Adapted from Pinel (1999)) 
Stereotypes about young voters have not affected me personally. (R)  
0               1               2               3               4               5               6  
strongly disagree     neither agree nor disagree     strongly agree 
 
I never worry that my level of political knowledge will be viewed as stereotypical of young voters. (R) 
0               1               2               3               4               5               6  
strongly disagree     neither agree nor disagree     strongly agree 
 
When interacting with older Americans, I feel like they interpret all of my political opinions in terms of the fact 
that I am a young voter. 
0               1               2               3               4               5               6  
strongly disagree     neither agree nor disagree     strongly agree 
 
Most older Americans do not judge young voters on their level of political knowledge. (R) 
0               1               2               3               4               5               6  
strongly disagree     neither agree nor disagree     strongly agree 
 
My being a young voter does not influence how other young voters act with me. (R)  
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0               1               2               3               4               5               6  
strongly disagree     neither agree nor disagree     strongly agree 
 
I almost never think about the fact that I am a young voter. (R)  
0               1               2               3               4               5               6  
strongly disagree     neither agree nor disagree     strongly agree 
 
My being a young voter does not influence how older Americans act with me. (R)  
0               1               2               3               4               5               6  
strongly disagree     neither agree nor disagree     strongly agree 
 
Most older Americans have more anti- young voter thoughts than they actually express. 
0               1               2               3               4               5               6  
strongly disagree     neither agree nor disagree     strongly agree 
 
I often think that older Americans are unfairly accused of being anti-young voter. (R)  
0               1               2               3               4               5               6  
strongly disagree     neither agree nor disagree     strongly agree 
 
Most older Americans have a problem viewing young voters as equals.  
0               1               2               3               4               5               6  
strongly disagree     neither agree nor disagree     strongly agree 
 
Group Identification (Adapted from Luhtanen and Crocker (1992)) 
Overall, being a young voter has very little to do with how I feel about myself (reverse coded) 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
Being a young voter is an important reflection of who I am 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
Being a young voter is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am (reverse coded) 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
In general, being a young voter is an important part of my self-image 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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Domain Identification (Adapted from Spencer et al. (1999) and Aronson et al. (1999)) 
I like politics. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
Knowledge of politics is important to me. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I want to seek a career in politics. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I would describe myself as politically informed. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
I would be embarrassed if I did not do well on a political knowledge test. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
 
General self-efficacy (From Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995) 
 
How true are these statements for you? 
 
1. I can always manage to solve difficult problems if I try hard enough. 
 Not at all true     Hardly True     Moderately True     Exactly True 
 
2. If someone opposes me, I can find the means and ways to get what I want. 
 Not at all true     Hardly True     Moderately True     Exactly True 
 
3. It is easier for me to stick to my aims and accomplish my goals.  
 Not at all true     Hardly True     Moderately True     Exactly True 
 
4. I am confident that I could deal efficiently with unexpected events. 
 Not at all true     Hardly True     Moderately True     Exactly True 
 
5. Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know how to handle unforeseen situations. 
 Not at all true     Hardly True     Moderately True     Exactly True 
 
6. I can solve most problems if I invest the necessary effort. 
 Not at all true     Hardly True     Moderately True     Exactly True 
 
7. I can remain calm when facing difficulties because I can rely on my coping abilities.  
 Not at all true     Hardly True     Moderately True     Exactly True 
 
8. When I am confronted with a problem, I can usually find several solutions.  
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 Not at all true     Hardly True     Moderately True     Exactly True 
 
9. If I am in trouble, I can usually think of a solution. 
 Not at all true     Hardly True     Moderately True     Exactly True 
 
10. I can usually handle whatever comes my way.  
 Not at all true     Hardly True     Moderately True     Exactly True 
 
 
 
Demographics 
Were you eligible to vote in the 2008 election?  
Did you vote in the 2008 election? 
Do you intend to vote in the 2012 election? 
Please list your age ___ 
Please list your gender ____ 
Please list your race ____ 
Which of the following political parties best exemplifies your political beliefs? 
Republican 
Democrat 
Independent 
Green 
Libertarian 
Other 
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Appendix F 
 
Humorousness manipulation check 
How funny would you rate that statement? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not at all         A little       Somewhat                  Very                Extremely 
 
 
How clever would you rate that statement? 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not at all         A little       Somewhat                  Very                Extremely 
 
 
How confusing would you rate that statement? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not at all         A little       Somewhat                  Very                Extremely 
 
How complicated would you rate that statement? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not at all         A little       Somewhat                  Very                Extremely 
 
How informative would you rate that statement? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not at all         A little       Somewhat                  Very                Extremely 
 
How negative would you rate that statement? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Not at all         A little       Somewhat                  Very                Extremely 
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Appendix G 
Humor expectancy manipulation check 
I expected the statement to be funny. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I expected to have to figure out/work through a joke. 
  1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I was looking forward to reading the statement. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I assumed I would enjoy the statement. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I assumed the statement would be important. (reverse coded) 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I assumed the statement would be lighthearted. 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
 
I assumed the statement would be complex. (reverse coded) 
   1    2    3    4    5   
   Strongly Disagree      Strongly Agree 
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